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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In October of 1968 the Peruvian military deposed the then cur-
rent elected government and started on a path of change and conserva-
tion. The Revolutionary Military Government of Peru has been in power
for ten years and has gone through one coup and several reversals of
fundamental policy. Tliis historical experience has made it unique
amongst the military regimes of contemporary Latin America. In the
wake of the establishment of this singular military regime, a small
rivulet of literature has sprung forth. Sociologists and political
scientists have fixed upon this Hispanic society, and produced works
trying to classify and analyze this phenomenon. I, too, want to con-
tribute to this effort to explain this experiment. In my effort I shall
offer a coherent accounting of the actions and policy formation of the
military in Peru, in the period of 1968 to 1978. This paper will
analyze Peruvian politics as part of a larger whole. In this analysis
I would like to establish the concern with ethos management as one of
the dominant forces in the Peruvian political process.
Political analysis deals with part of the mix of motivations
that actualizes human behavior. Although culture has been accorded a
place in contemporary political analysis, I want to place a different
emphasis on it. To that end this paper will present a logical progres-
sion of investigation. First this paper discusses the nature of South
1
2American culture and the process of cultural evolution. The paper then
reviews a newer category of interpretation for Latin American politics.
This is the corporatist school of thought. The significance of inves-
tigating corporatist elements in Latin American politics is explained
next. That is followed with a review of the current Peruvian govern-
ment. This review is split into two parts. The first part is an ac-
count of the Velasco government in the period from 1968 to 1975. With
the ascension of Morales Bermudez in 1975 there is a genuine sea-change
and the second part analyzes the significance of events in the period
from 1975 to 1978.
CHAPTER II
THE PURSUIT OF ETHOS MAINTENANCE
The impact of a nation's culture uniquely shapes its political
experiences. However, the evaluation of cultural traits is often as-
signed a low degree of relevance in political analysis. The case of
Peru is no different. Since the ruling military junta took over, a
significant body of literature has been produced. With rare exception
the central concerns have been to look for "progress" or a change in
the system. Wlio possesses power and to what ends power is used are
the questions. The significant indicators are usually portrayed to
be decisions about the redistribution of wealth and decisions about
social mobilization. The less tangible concerns in political activity
are not as readily analyzed.
Ethos maintenance is a phrase that describes the concern of a
significant body of political actors with preserving a value system.
It is a value system that facilitates some very specific activities.
Ethos, per se, is a general state of mind:
The ethos is taken to mean the constallation of acquired
drives or motivations that are characteristic of the culture,
plus the goals, both explicit and implicit, toward which cul-
tural activities are directed or upon which high value is
placed .
1
^John Gillin, "Ethos Components in Modern Latin American
Culture," American Anthropologist , 57:53 (June 1955) :48-59, as printed
in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams, ed . , Contemporary Cultures and
Societies of Latin America (New York: Random House, 1965).
3
4The activities and goals upon which high values are placed by
tlie inhabitants of Peru are very diverse and sometimes diametrically
opposed. For matters of political analysis, one ends up focusing on
the educated, professional or clerical, catholic, metropolitan, Cauca-
sian or acculturated mestizo, middle, upper middle, and upper economic
strata of Peruvian society.
This minority possesses almost all private wealth in the coun-
try. It runs the newspapers, universities, and schools. They populate
the government civil service, the officer corps of the military, the
leadership of most political parties, and the native Peruvian enter-
])rises. The existing society is the product of the goals and ideals
of these people and tliey are its chief beneficiaries. Both what is
good and what is bad in Peru may be attributed to them.
The established norms, values, and goals of Peruvian society
have been put to an escalating questioning in the last thirty years.
In the last fifteen years there have been formal attempts to overturn
the established society in Peru. Continuing today, a basic questioning
of the society's operating values is being forcefully made in the
Peruvian political arena. All aspects of the established value sys-
tem are on the line. The ethical norms that make acceptable many of
the mundane activities of the powerful minority are being subject to
trial. Examples of this are the questioning of the uses of private
wealth, and the questioning of the very possession of private wealth.
The right of a free press gets questioned in a society, where a wealthy
few owned the "private" press and pursued their special interests.
The validity of the idea that political parties will represent the
5peojile is quest Loned In a society/where literacy requirements keep
t
large numbers of adults unenfranchised. These issues are specific
instances of a questioning of the larger value system that accepts and
legitimizes tlie existing order.
Tlie goal of ethos preservation is pursued because it provides
a much broader analytic focus. Political analysis has expanded tremen-
dously in the ]H)s t— \\Jor Id War II world. The wide range of human motiva-
tion tliat animates political actors is still not satisfactorily ex-
plored. To establish a plausible reason for the emphasis on ethos
preservation 1 \ ant to explain liow human motivation is more fully
covered by empliasizing ethos-oriented analysis. I also want to relate
the emphases of political analysis to a typology of human motivation.
Witli that for a starting place, I will look for the reasons the place
of ethos is difficult to find in political analysis.
Looking for the place of a national ethos in political analy-
sis is something of a problematic task. It is my contention that this
is difficult because contemporary political analysis is oriented to
the evaluation of the concrete products of human activity. The sig-
nificant aspects of human motivation are presumed to be discernible
in the conventional concerns with wealth, control of structures of
coercion, and formal political organization. These concerns with the
concrete aspects of power must be complemented with an appreciation
of the place of psychological utility.
The place of psychological utility becomes significant because
it goes further in lielping to interpret human motivation. The concern
of psychological utility gets treated by many authors, but there is one
6author in particular that has created a more fruitful base for under-
standing human motivation. This writer is the psychologist Abraham
Maslow.
Abraham Maslow, in his Motivation and Personality
, outlines a
Hierarchy of Needs to explain the basis of human motivation. Maslow'
s
description of tlie Hierarchy of Needs goes a long way towards explain-
ing how psychological utility permeates human action. That gives me
my basis for criticizing political analysis.
Interpreting human behavior offers insights into the nature of
human decision making, and this gives one a firmer base for making
analyses of the policies and actions of political actors.
Maslow' s Hierarchy of Needs is prefaced by some general quali-
fications. Maslovi/ prefaces his theory with the observation that,
Behavior is determined by several classes of deter-
minants, of which motivation is one and environmental forces
is another. The study of motivation does not negate or deny
the study of situational determinants, but rather supplements
it . 2
This is further qualified with the observation that "not all behaviors
or reactions are motivated, at least not in the ordinary sense of seek-
ii3ing need gratifications, i.e., seeking for what is lacked or needed."
These qualifications set limits for extrapolating reasons for
political action. 1 have read these reservatinos as a statement that
human behavior is multidimensional and sometimes less than purposeful.
The possibility that human behavior is not one dimensional and is not
^Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper
and Row, 1970), p. 29.
^Ibid., p. 30.
7rational limits the i)otential for constructing
of political action.
The hierarchy alluded to consists of a
claims that people are concerned with meeting,
can be shown as a ranked scale starting at the
very comprehensive laws
succeeding chain of
Schematically, this
bottom and moving to-
wards the top;
7. The Aestlietlc Needs;
The Desires to Know and to Understand;
5. Desire for Self-Actualization;
A. The Esteem Needs;
3. Belonging and Love Needs;
2. Safety Needs;
1. Physiological Needs.
The most pressing needs are the physiological needs. If all
needs are neglected then the personwho is so suffering finds all other
needs disappear, and they find that the dominant concern is for food,
4
sex, shelter, sleep, etc. As soon as these needs are satisfied they
recede into the background and the next complex of needs emerges. This
cluster is referred to as the safety needs and they are specified as
"security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, from
anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in
the protector; and so on."^ This cycle keeps repeating itself until
conditions allow the person to meet the full complex of human needs.
It should be pointed out that the Hierarchy of Needs is not
an immovable fixed order, and it should be pointed out that acts or
^ f bid
.
, p . 39
.
^fbid.
8wishes express nuiltii^ie motivations.^^
Throughout this scheme there is an implicit statement that
people (most people that is) are always concerned with looking after
their conscious and unconscious felt needs. This comprehensive concern
with meeting your felt needs 1 interpret as a concern with psychological
utility
.
Political analysis is concerned with analyzing the use, pos-
session and transfer of power. As practiced, political analysis often
ends up preoccupied with the material correlates of power. As an exam-
ple, weiilth can be shown to be a source, tool and end-product of power.
It cannot, hov\/ever, be established as the exclusive or universally
paramount concern.
I am asserting that psychological utility is ubiquitous in
human motivation, but this does not help to greatly simplify analytic
matters, as there is direct utility and indirect utility. The economic
correlates should l)e looked upon as an expression of direct utility.
Matters of direct utility deal with the directly measurable power re-
sources; who occupies v^7hat social base of power, who possesses which
material goods and how existing institutions operate are primary con-
cerns. Tliese factors can all be shown to have economic correlates,
hence the temptation to do analysis centered on class interest or eco-
nomic benefit. Political analysis that is concerned with indirect
utility tries to deal with those social manifestations of values, cul-
ture, worldview, ethos, and personality that channel political activ-
^Ibid
. ,
p . 23.
ity.
9This is observably difficult. Political culture analysis is
the only established mode of this type of analysis. Coming up with
measurable variables becomes a harder task. One of the results is that
one often ends up making generalizations instead of formulating theory.
The modes of analysis can be related back to Maslow's elabora-
tion of needs in human motivation. As argued by Maslow, human needs
cover a wide range of endeavors. Once the matter of moment to moment
survival is met all of these needs make themselves felt. An analysis
concerned v\rith direct utility pays attention to those events that in-
fluence the physiological needs and the safety needs. It also meets
some of the belonging needs and actualization needs. Analysis oriented
towards indirect utility pays attention to those events that affect
the esteem needs, and the desire to know and understand needs, plus
some of the belonging and love needs and some of the self-actualization
needs
.
In brief summation Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs offers a defini-
tion and model of human behavior. This model of motivation allows one
to classify analytic schemes with regard to the facets of human motiva-
tion. This in turn allows you to see what is being looked at and what
is not being looked at. Ethos-oriented analysis is a vital analytic
scheme. It will produce information that will complement the informa-
tion generated by analytic schemes concerned with direct utility.
Another reason that ethos maintenance is going to provide use-
ful information for the analysis of a political system is because of
its concern with cultural patterns. This will provide a unique source
of information because individual cultures are unique, and.
10
No one culture system completely satisfies all human
needs and potentialities, each system has defects corre-
sponding to its virtues. Underlying historical, cultivatedhuman nature we may assume a metabiological human nature
which contains a reservoir of potentialities and capabili-
ties which are available for future cultural exploration.^
Hence the necessity of finding a focus to weigh this.
Culture is construed as the agency that people have developed
to meet their needs within the context of their society. It is a
tool, a psychological prosthesis. Cultural values have been portrayed
as original products of the concern with finding ways to meet human
needs. This interpretation of culture shows that it is a way to meet
a Hierarcliy of Needs as postulated by Maslow. Once instituted cul-
ture becomes a force in its own right, and an analytic entity in its
own right. This institutes a dilemma as,
Once begun, the process becomes cyclical, societies
developing cultures, and the cultures in turn affecting
their societies. There is no a priori logical necessity
for setting up a linear, one-way cultural or societal de-
terminism and to regard another culture or society as the
primary determinant of the other.
8
Having covered my assumptions of human nature I operate on and
the concepts of cultural concerns related to political analysis in this
paper, I would like to explain my choice of analytic action. In the
citation where the cyclical nature of society and values were stated, I
see an obstacle to establishing comprehensive theories to deal with
specific variables examined in political analysis. This dilemma may
push one back to another question that must be dealt with. That is the
David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1953), p. 81.
8
Ibid
. ,
p . 104.
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matter of deciding whether your interpretation of events can be ordered
into a theory.
As the field of political science has developed there has been
a consistent concern with basing the field on a firm scientific foot-
ing. In order to improve the reliability of political analysis, and
to produce laws and models, practitioners of political science have
been doing their best to pattern their analytic activities on adapta-
tions of scientific method as it developed in the physical sciences.
While trying to appropriate the fruits of positivist philosophy, many
empirical political scientists have been consistently producing un-
successful models. From my readings I have come to the conclusion
that most of tiie effort to construct political theory has failed. Wliat
has happened is that a great volume of analytic approaches has been
generated and described as theories.
Constructing political theory requires a decision to single
out a phenomenon to be explained. After one has formed the question
one should construct a hypothesis that will specify a relationship be-
tween the dependent variables and one or more independent variables.
If you are interested in a direct statistical relationship, you will
want to formulate a null hypothesis. This states that there is no re-
lationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.
You may reject your null hypothesis if you establish a significant
relationship between yt)ur variables. This establishes a positive re-
9iationship for your hypotheses.
^G. David CJarson, Handbook of Political Science Methods
(Boston: Holbrook Press, 1976).
12
Bill and llardgrave go into great detail categorizing the
analytic schemes utilized by political scientists in comparative govern-
ment, Using the categories that Bill and Hardgrave list, I have cre-
ated a tree to show how the analytic approach diverges from theory
formation. This tree starts with the generalization and then proceeds,
Generalization—statement of uniformities in
the relations between two or more variables
of well defined classes;
Hypothesis—a generalization presented in ten-
tative and conjectural terms;
Ap p roach a predisposition to Theory—a set of systematically
adopt a particular conceptual related generalizations suggest-
framework and to explore cer- ing new observations for empiri-
tain types of hypotheses to- cal testing;
wards the generation of theory.
Law—a hypothesis of universal
form that has withstood inten-
sive experimentation.
The analytic approach is the form that will be used for my
analytic comment, liowever, I will make an effort to speculate on some
theory formation in my summary.
A pursuit of ethos maintenance is a valid concern. Human
needs are diverse, you cannot Balkanize them or explain motivation and
behavior by referring to a few aspects of the whole human organism.
Political analysis has to operate under these imperatives also. I
have argued that analytic scliemes become preoccupied with one aspect
of utility, while ignoring other aspects of utility. This general ob-
servation applies to the study of Latin American politics also. In
the 1970s the scope of Latin American political analysis was expanded
^^James A. Bill and William Hardgrave, Comparative Politics: The
Quest for Theory (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1973).
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by the emergence of a corporatist conception of Latin American politics.
Ihe tendency, however, to focus on either direct utility or indirect
utility has persisted. This prompts me to make this effort to advo-
cate the utility of ethos maintenance.
In extrapolation I am stating that politics in Latin America
are observably different from the conduct of politics in other parts
of the world. What makes this so are the unique characteristics of
Latin American society. Many authors have argued that there is a larger
cultural unity tluit permeates the world view of Hispanic America. My
roiidings of Latin American society impel me to agree with this argu-
ment. The nature of this unique Latin American culture will be de-
scribed in detail iii a succeediiig chapter. The significance of a re-
gional culture system lies in the ethos generated by it. It is my con-
tention that politics in Peru are dominated by the concern with main-
taining the ethos of the existing society.
CHAPTER III
NATURE AND DYN.IMICS OF A RELEVANT LATIN AMERICAN
CULTURE MODEL
The conduct of politics in Latin America is observably differ-
ent from the conduct of politics in other parts of the world. Wliat
makes this so is the unicjue characteristics of Latin American society.
Latin America has repeatedly been described as a culture area in its
own right. Tliis cultural differentiation provides a critical insight
for the student of comparative government.
Many authors have argued that there is a larger cultural iden-
tity unifying the worldview of Hispanic America. Both historians and
anthropologists have pursued this topic, often in a separate develop-
ment .
Historians concerned with government in Latin America fre-
quently start iit Richard M. Morse's "Toward a Theory of Spanish
American Government . ^ Morse's work is seminal as he is the first
contemporary historian in the Anglo-American world to argue for the
unique historical expei'ience of Spanish America as the critical ex-
planatory factor.
A common starting point for an anthropologist develop-
ing the topic of Latin American culture is "Modern Latin American
^^Richard M. Morse, "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Govern-
ment," Journal of L he History of Ideas , xv (1954) : 71-93
.
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Culture by John P. (,illin. Ciliin is the most commonly cited author
in books examining Latin American culture. He is commonly credited
with creating and championing the concept.
Examining both the efforts of historians and anthropologists
to expand upon tlie idea of a common Latin American civilization, I have
found that there is a line of anthropologists who have made a very
sophisticated effort to construct a model. It is this line of develop-
ment that I will follow in this chapter. This chapter is concerned
with describing the nature of a Latin American culture system and how
Peru is a part of it. 1 will then explain Emilio Willems description
of the Latin American cultural dynamic and what that does to the politi-
cal process.
People like John P. Ciliin, Charles Wagley, Ceorge M. Foster,
Ricliard N. Adams, and Emilio Willems have done some fundamental work
in analytic concepts related to the study of Latin American culture
and it is with Ciliin that I start.
In a series of articles between 1942 and 1947 Gillen argues
for the designation of Latin America as a bona fide culture area in its
own right. Althougli Ciliin is sensitive to regional variations,
Spanish America and Brazil are seen as recipients of a comparable
Iberian heritage and a comparable Colonial experience. The general-
ized Latin American experience is hypothesized accordingly:
^^This was originally contained in Social Forces , 25(3) (March
1947) : 243-48
,
and reprinted in John P. Ciliin, Human Ways, Selected
Essays in Anthropology (Pittsburgh, PA; University of Pittsburgh Press,
I%9).
16
. all are nominally Roman Catholic, and many of the de-
tails of content and organization are those of Iberian
Catholicism as distinguished from the Northern European
type.
. , . Ideologically this culture is humanistic rather
than puritanical.
. . . Intellectually it is characterized
and dialectics, rather than by empiricism and prag-
matics
. .
. the worth of the logic lies in the manipulation
of concepts, not in the empirical investigation of premises.
• •
. [We] find a vast variety of ideas derived from numer-
ous sources ideas from the Enlightenment; from the French
and American Revolutions; and more recently from Marxism
.
. . ue see other Spanish or Spanish Colonial patterns in
town planning ... in family organization, official male
dominance, double standard of sex morality
. . . specific
concepts of personal honor and emphasis upon form in inter-
personal relations; and in the patterns of Roman law and
certain political statuses still persisting from the colon-
ial system.
.
13
A detailed description of agriculture, arcliitecture and clothing is
also made by Gill in.
Gillin states that his formulation is speculative and leaves
open the concept for expansion. He lists several points that investi-
gators should pursue. The nature of the sixteenth and seventeenth
century Spanish donor society was not well defined at the time of his
speculation. He calls for such an investigation. The colonial experi-
ence of Spanish America and Brazil is presumed to be comparable but
detailed proof is not furnished. Regional variation is mentioned and
attributed to the environment with little explanation. Change in
society is attributed to cultural diffusion with sparse example. The
cultural environment is a somewhat stark Latin American or non-Latin
Mierican environment. These reservations give copious room for re-
finement and several authors pick this up.
Wagley takes up tlie challenge and deals with several of the
1 3
Ibid., pp. 82-84.
17
larger gaps in Gill in’s formulation. Accepting the "cultural common
denoma nator" of Gill in, Wagley creates a typology of subcultures de-
rived from the larger tradition. These are nine interrelated subcul-
tures. The physical environment, the local economy, and the rural-
urban dichotomy is credited with creating subcultural groupings across
Latin America. Similar sub-cultural groupings are described as having
arisen in different countries. These different subcultures give dif-
ferent emphasis to the general aspects of the larger Latin American
culture. As various countries contain different mixes of the sub-
cultural groupings their individual focus is different from one an-
other. This is offered as an explanation of how the countries of
Latin America can have a conmaon cultural heritage while being visibly
different societies.
Gillin's original typology was a native culture and a Latin
American culture. Wagley sees nine distinct subcultural groupings and
is open to his types being redefined into more groups, if this is analy-
tically relevant. These groups are:
1. Tribal Indian Cultures (lowland societies);
2. Modern Indian Cultures (highland societies);
3. Peasant cultures;
4. Engenho Plantation (traditional);
5. Usina Plantation (modern);
b. Town Culture;
7. Metropolitan Upper Class;
"'diaries Wagley, Tlie Latin American Tradition: Essays on the
Unity and the Diversi ty of Latin American Culture (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968), p. 36.
18
8. Metropolitan Middle Class:
9- Urban Proletariat.^^
One of the salient characteristics of these cultural subgroup-
ings IS the linlcage of societal groups. One of the characteristics
of the Modern Indian Culture is the presence of Hispanic peasants.
Part of the Town subculture is a response to the presence of peasant
communities. The interrelated parts do not function in isolation,
there are many symbiotic relationships.
An example of how societies which are part of the same larger
culture can be distinctly different would be a comparison of Bolivia
and Uruguay. Uruguay is the most urban of the Latin American socie-
ties--82%—while Bolivia is one of the most rural socieites with only
39,^ of its population in cities. Bolivia, one of the centers of the
highland Indian population, has an Indian population of 63%, while
Uruguary has no known Indian population. The presence of different
mixes of emphasis on the nature of the Latin American culture renders
hopeless analytic assumptions that they are interchangeably similar.
George M. Foster has handled one of the other points that must
be established for the argument of Gillin. Foster did the detailed
research on Spanish society of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
He also carefully researched the social practices and culture items
[)resent in contemporary Latin America. Foster established an obvious
cultural continuity between the Spanish donor society and contemporary
Latin America. Foster argued for the concept of reduction and crystal
15
Ibid
. , pp . 83-84
.
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1 • .
• 16lizaLion.
Reduction and crystallization may be summarized so. In a con-
quest situation the dominant donor culture wittingly and unwittingly
goes through a process of screening and simplifying the elements of
their culture that tliey convey to the subject population. During the
initial period of contact there is a general acceptance of the differ-
ent elements of the donor culture and some internalization of elements
of the recipient culture. After an initial pattern is set up the
colonial culture becomes less permeable and is more resistant to lat-
ter attempts to modify tiie newly established society. This is called
crystallization.
The process of reduction and crystallization explains why
aspects of colonial society were noticeably different from the donor
society. It also explains why older patterns, extinct in Europe,
persist in Latin America.
One of the contemporary extensions of the concept of a Latin
American culture is the work of Emilio Willems. Willems has taken
up the initiative of Gillen, Wagley, Foster, and Adams and written
Latin America : An Anthro pological Synthesis . Willems proceeds to tie
up looser ends left by his predecessors. He describes the historical
experience of Spain and Portugal before the discovery, as significant-
ly similar. He also describes the colonial experience as producing
the same results. In both Brazil and Spanish America, although some
^^George H. Foster, Culture and Conquest (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle
Books, 1960), !)p. 232-33.
^
^Emilio Wiliems, Lati n i\merica: An Anthropological Synthesis
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 150.
20
Lhings took place under different auspices (viz. the Indians being re-
duced by the conquistadors compared to the Indians being reduced by
the j^-ideirantes ) , the result over time was often the same.
In his noticeably more comprehensive work, Willems tries to
outline tlie larger dilemmas that Latin American societies have to deal
with. Willems devotes space to the problems of governing a society
that operates under the impetus of the larger Latin American experi-
ence. In Willems 's eyes, tliere are four complementing experiences
that set the parameters of Latin American problems: the Iberian heri-
tage, tlie conquest, the colonial legacy and the belated modernization
of Latin America via secondary development. This created some very
fundamental obstacles for any government trying to rule a Latin
American society.
Government in Latin America has had to operate with the tradi-
18tion of a patrimonial state. Willems makes a direct extension of
Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism to explain the traditional state.
A pervasive characteristic of the state in a patrimonial society is
the lack of differentiation between what is public and what is private.
Governmental positions bestow personal privilege, they do not entail
obligations. The people are subjects, not citizens. The governmental
machinery is expected to grant favors on a personal basis, not to give
out services. All power flows from the head of state, and in theory
it is limitless. In practice, the executive's power is limited by the
traditional expectations of the subjects. Beyond this attitude to
18
Ibid
.
, p . 89 .
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power and government tliere are four currently operating traditions
that influence government in Latin America.
These four legacies are a tradition of rebellion and a tradi-
tion of autocracy, a tradition of non-compliance with the law, and the
pattern of military involvement in politics.
There is a tradition of rebelling against unacceptable oppres-
sion. Willems notes some seventy-six major rebellions on a citywide
or province-wide basis prior to independence.^^ Negro slaves, Indians,
mestizos, and creoles found cause to rebel on a regular basis. The
desire for freedom, the encroachment of land by big landowners, the
need to replace a particularly venal or inefficient bureaucrat, the
need to repeal a tax ruinous to a local economy or the operation of a
trade monopoly that bore harshly on the citizenry—all these prompted
large and occasionally successful rebellions.
The idea that the citizenry ought to rise up when faced with
an unbearable wrong is closely complemented by the idea that non-
compliance with the law is acceptable. The combination of predatory
tax systems, restrictive trade monopolies, and an absolutist rule of
a distant colony rendered it necessary or desirable for large numbers
20
of the inhabit^ints to ignore the law. Law enforcement became
problematic as the inability of the colonial government to enforce
unpopular statutes was established. It is here that colonial func-
tionaries created the philosophy of obedzco ])ero no cumplo .
19
., • )Ibid .
,
p. 23.
20
,, .
,Ibid .
,
p. 179.
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Two other complementary patterns are the autocratic heritage
and the involvement of military tradition. The autocratic heritage is
a function of a patrimonial state where all decisions are a prerequi-
site of the king. The granting of authority to regional or local
governments might have been functionally desirable, but it was re-
garded as too potentially subversive. A strong central government
ruled by an executive, with discretionary powers to take personal ac-
tion, was thouglit to be necessary if not desirable.
The authoritarian tradition worked with a pattern of military
involvement in politics to produce the high incidence of military
government. Willems starts with the caudillo and gives a common in-
terpretation of the breakdown of authority, after the independence, as
22the cause for the participation of the military in politics.
These ongoing traditions have made the conduct of politics
unique in Latin America.
Viewing Latin America as a culture system is significant for
the study of comparative government as it may reveal or suggest the
centrality of integration in a society. Willems does this and ar-
rives at a conclusion held by many political scientists. That is,
the conclusion that the crisis of Latin American culture and the crisis
of the different Latin American societies is a crisis of national in-
tegration.
V\/iliems describes a cultural dynamic centered around adaptation
^^Ibid.
,
p. 92.
Ibid
. ,
p
.
88.
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and integration. The author's points may be abstracted into the fol-
lowing statements.
1. A culture must be able to adapt to a changing environment.
The d etjji Pqj- ^ given society's culture is to meet the need
to cope with internal or external dilemmas^^ (viz. how to propagate
the group identity that will impel people to work for common goals).
This is a response to the need to adapt to a changing or potentially
changing environment
.
2. (]ultural evolution is a necessity for a society's adapta-
tion. The ultimate test of a successful culture is the survival of the
24
society. Cultural evolution is a necessity for all but the most
isolated and static societies.
3. Although cultural evolution is a necessity it depends on
the internal differentiation of the society. Willems specifically
states that,
. . . cultural evolution of a society refers to all the
processes that produce internal diversification and increas-
ing specialization of the diversified parts. In the social
structure, evolution is virtually identical with divisions
of labor (i.e., tlie dividing and subdividing of social
groups and the assignment to them of specific activities)
.
Evolution of the social structure goes hand in hand with
n c
evolutionary changes in technology and economy.'^-’
4. Internal differentiation depends on integration. The prob-
lem of Latin American societies becomes the problem of national inte-
gration. Willems states the proviso for successful evolution: "The
23
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viability of growing internal differentiation depends of course on
integration the maintenance of a common structure capable of relating
the different units to one another.
These statements taken in a sequential progression infer that
the success or ultimate test of a society is its ability to viably re-
late tiie different social groups to one another. Failure to devise or
maintain a mechanism for national integration may push a country into
a state of anomie or class warfare (depending on your analytic predilec
t ion)
.
It is at this point that we may make the transfer from anthro-
pological survey to political analysis.
Many analysts of Latin politics have made the point that
all Latin American countries are beset by varying degrees of conflict
that results from the lack of national integration. Carlos Astiz is
one such social scientist. Astiz is concerned with analyzing Peruvian
politics and he is quite sure about what the basic issue is in that
society. The issue is what kind of society shall we have and what
will the power relations be. This is stated so; "The most pressing
issues in Latin America generally, and in Peru specifically, are those
concerned with the fundamental character of the social order itself,
not whether this or that group should be favored by a particular
27
policy that will achieve common goals."
Peru is a country that is intimately involved in the Spanish
Ibid
. ,
p . 166.
Carlos Astiz, I’ressure Croups and Power Elites in Peruvian
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. ix.
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American tradition. It has been subject to the same larger cultural
legacy as its Latin American confreres
. And Peru like the rest of
Latin America has come into the modern world tlirough a process of
secondary development. (Willems here accepts Richard N. Adams’s the-
. 28,
sis
. )
National integration is a problem that most Latin American
societies have inherited. The withdrawal of Spanish authority, follow-
ing the wars of independence, was the first serious impairment of in-
tegrating mechanisms in Latin American society. The second common
disequil Ibrating experience was the wholesale movement into modernity
via secondary development. Peru operates with this legacy.
There are many local characteristics that produce a potential
for conflict. Peru is a diverse society and a traditional one. Fric-
tions betv\?een the Indian and non-Indian community can and do arise.
The rural and the urban populations have different interests, and an
urban proletariat has a hard time marshalling acceptance in a society
in which it is not paramount.
A society as conflict-prone as Peru is going to be concerned
with integrating mechanisms. And the current political situation re-
flects this. The government of Peru has been cast as a corporatlvist
experiment by several authors. 1 will examine the idea of corporativ-
ist politics and explain why this is attractive to the dominant politi-
cal actors in Peru.
28
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CHAPTER IV
C0RP01l,\TISM AS AN ANALYTIC APPROACH
Corporatist political philosophy is not new. In the West, the
Middle Ages saw a feudal society that first proposed the .idea that
society s best interests are met by organizing interest on a function-
al basis. The ideal of defining society by functional sectors faded
under the dual impact of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution. As society became more urban, industrial and
anomic, interest in the idea reemerged in Europe.
Corporatism in another branch of European cultural expansion,
Latin A.merica, had a different history. It can be argued, as Richard
Morse lias argued, that a body of late feudal institutions and ideas
29
never quite disappeared from Latin American society. Corporatism
can be shown to be present in varying degrees in the political and
social concerns of Ibero-Latin society. This in turn renders cor-
poratism a useful focus for political analysis.
Three general approaches for corporatist analysis have evolved
so far. They share some assumptions and disagree on other aspects.
I would like to outline these three approaches, and then offer my uni-
fied analysis of the corporatist nature of Latin American politics.
The three authors that have staked out new territory in the conceptual-
^^This is part of an essay written by Morse, included in
Louis Hartz, ed
. ,
The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1964).
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ization of corporatist analysis are Howard Wiarda, Phillipe Schmitter,
and Guillermo O'Donnell. These three authors are the primary referents
for contemporary articles arguing for a corporatist analysis of Latin
American politics. All three authors can be reconciled to a general
definition of corporatism. For the example 1 will use a definition
that Pliillipe Schmitter has proposed:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organ-
ized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarhically ordered and functionally dif-
ferentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representa-
tional monopoly within their respective categories in ex-
change for observing certain controls on their selection
of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.
The authors do differ on several points. These reflect two
dimensions. One of these dimensions is scope and the other is an eco-
nomic or culture dichotomy. Phillipe Schmitter argues that corporatism
is an universal phenomenon, with two different types. One of these
types is most prevalent in Latin America. It is not uniquely Latin
American and neither is it a cultural manifestation. Howard Wiarda
acknowledges the universality of corporatism, but argues that Latin
America is part of a larger Ibero-Latin tradition and thus possesses
its own unique brand of corporatism that is reemerging. Guillermo
O'Donnell enters, third, with his conception of populist and bureau-
cratic/authoritarian corporatism. O'Donnell argues against any unique
cultural forces and further restricts his thesis to South America
^^Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", in
The New Corporatism: Socio-Political Structures in the Iberian Wo rld,
ed. Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1974).
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proper, excluding Middle America and Iberia. O'Donnell insists that
events can only be meaningfully interpreted by examining the nature
of capitalist development in the society being observed.
Chronologically, Wiarda precedes the other two authors. As
the other authors make some effort to state their arguments in juxta-
position to Wiarda, I will start my abstraction of arguments with the
work of VJiarda. Wiarda 's analysis is grounded on the observation that
there is a real, definable, cultural tradition in the Ibero-American
world. In this common historical experience, and common cultural back-
ground, there are common conceptions of state, legitimate authority,
and the individual's relation to society. There are common conceptions
of how you should channel political activity. The central arguments
will be summarized in the following paragraphs.
1. The West in general and the U.S. in particular has been
undeniably ethnocentric in trying to fit Latin America
into universal analytic schemes.
Wiarda argues for a recognition that Western social science
has done a poor job of explaining political dynamics in Latin America,
for most of the post-World War II period. Although some deficiencies
can be chalked up to ethnocentricity
,
specific insensitivities in
/\merican scholarship can be explained by the polar opposition of major
environmental characteristics. The American academic milieu can be
seen as an essentially secular and scientific establishment. It is
operating in a predominantly Protestant and pluralist nation. This can
raise problems witii efforts to analyze an essentially Catholic society
that possesses "as its basis a moral idealism, a philosophical cer-
tainty, a sense of continuity, and a unified organic-corporate concep-
29
tion of the state and society.
2. The Iberic-Latin tradition represents a fourth world ofdevelopment
.
In trying to compensate for the tendency to use Western norms
of analysis it is not enough to realize that you are dealing with a
non-Northwestern European phenomenon. You must take into account some
fundamental characteristics that are unique to the region. Wiarda
detects "fragments and remnants of a peculiarly Iberic-European tradi-
tion dating from approximately 1500, with a political culture and a
socio-political order that at its core was essentially two class,
authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified,
32hierarchical and corjjorate." This heritage has channeled politics
into functional intereses
,
hence the special relevance of a corporatist
model of politics.
3. Political change in the Ibero-American region has been a
process of adjustment. The goal has been one of accommoda-
tion.
Reference is made here to Richard Adams and his theory of sec-
ondary development. Adams has proposed that national development in
the parts of the world that were isolated from the initial industrial
revolution is going to be different. In this sphere of secondary de-
velopment, modern patterns of social and political organization are
33borrowed and added on to the established socio-political system. In
31
Howard \Jiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political
Change in The Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World
Politics
,
XXV9 (January, 1973) :210.
^^Ibid., p. 209.
33 Ibid., p. 227.
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this scheme of affairs, tliere is neither a gradual evolution of the
society or an abrupt change of the larger society. Instead institu-
tions and practices are added on to the original society. It is
Wiarda's contention that the Iberic-Latin society's developmental ex-
perience has been one of secondary development. Politics in most of
the twentieth century has been a prolonged debate over how and under
what conditions the elements of modern industrial society will be in-
tegrated into the existing political structure. The result has been a
continuing parry and riposte between the older Ibero—Latin tradition
and successive waves of Western political formulas for social and
economic organization.
4. ihe analysis of politics in Latin America must come to
grips with the dissolving of the older power bases.
Although the older tradition persists it does not exist in a
vacuum. Some real changes have taken place, not all of the established
intereses have managed to age gracefully. Some of the old power bases
are eroding. In several countries landed wealth has been neutralized,
the social and legal influence of the church has been restricted and
the military has been steadily losing its ability to monopolize vio-
lence. Politics is persistently becoming more dominated by class,
34issues, and interest groups. Although there has been some real
change, no clear alternative pattern has established itself in most of
the countries. The older order is faded, but what if anything can suc-
cessfully replace it has yet to be made definite.
In contrast to Wiarda, the next two authors play down cultural
34
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inputs. Schmitter makes a determined effort to establish corporatist
politics as a broader Western phenomenon. In Schmitter' s opinion, cor-
poratism is more an ideology than a function of cultural expression.
Schmitter' s arguments can be classed into three basic assertions.
1. There is no sound basis for considering corporatism in
Latin America as an articulation of an unique historical
tradition.
First Schmitter points out that the advocates of corporatism
in the Iberian peninsula, and Latin America, based their movements or
programs on the writings and government from Europe. Schmitter draws
up a bibliograpliy of works, from 1850 to 1950, concerned with cor-
poratism. If tills list is examined, it appears that there are very
few Latin American or southern European authors who appear before the
35
second quarter of the twentietli century. This argument that the
theoretical elaborations of corporatism are an European construct is
important. This places a valuation on formal theory over de facto
practices
.
2. Corporatist systems can be differentiated into societal
corporatism and state corporatism.
Schmitter makes reference to the work of the Rumanian corporate
theorist, Mihail Manoilesco. Manoilesco distinguishes two types of
corporatist relations. In corporatlsme pur , "the legitimacy and func-
tioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the
activity of singular noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representa-
tive corporations."^^ Schmitter calls this societal corporatism.
^^Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", p. 230.
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Corporatisme subordonne is different because similarly structured cor-
porations are created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of
the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on
37
^ther bases. Schmitter calls this state corporatism. Societal cor-
poratism is a tendency that is found in advanced Western pluralistic
societies. State corporatism is explained as a development of a floun-
dering pluralist political system.
3. The emergence of corporatist politics is a direct func-
tion of the needs of capitalism to reproduce the condi-
tions for its existence and continually to accumulate
further resources.
On a more fundamental level, Schmitter argues that such sym-
pathetic analysts of capitalism as John Maynard Keynes and Andrew
Shonfield have shown tlat capitalist-oriented societies have an inter-
est in establ Isliing coiporatist interest formation. In an essay en-
titled "The End of Lait sez-Faire" (written in 1926), Keynes suggests
that private self-interest is neither inevitably efficient or inevitably
in society's best interest. Because of the complex nature of modern
society there is a seer need for semi-autonomous interest associations
to mediate between the individual and the state. Specifically, Keynes
is cited as suggesting "a return, it may be said towards medieval con-
38
ceptions of separate autonomies." In more recent times, Andrew
Shonfield, the author of Modern Capitalism , is cited as arguing that
complex, interdependent, modern societies need to be able to predict
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 103
.
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their future environment if they are going to be able to make extended
plans for future economic activity. This imperative biases state
and economic interests to favor establishing interest associations and
to them encourage them to conclude modus vivendls
. In this instance,
rational self-interest is supposed to be propelling people towards the
construction of a corporatist society.
Guillermo O'Donnell is one of the late contributors to the cor-
poratist scliool of analysis. O'Donnell originally formulated a theory
for explaining the development of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes
40throughout Latin America. O'Donnell's original work implied an emer-
gence of a corporatist "solution" and it does not require very much of
an extension to make this an analysis of the corporatist phenomenon.
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In a later article this extension is made. O'Donnell's general con-
ception of corporatism as a structure is compatible with Wiarda and
Schmitter, but his differences are sufficient to detail his contribu-
t ion
.
1. There are old ideological continuities, but corporatism
in Latin America, as an operating set of societal struc-
tures, is an historically recent phenomenon.
Corporatism is seen as a result of a crisis of the state in a
society that has been penetrated by international capital. Specifically
39
^Ibid., p. 112.
^*^Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernization and Bureaucratic-
Authoritarianism," Politics of Modernization Series , no. 9 (Berkeley,
CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California-
Berkeley
,
1973).
^^Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the
State," in Authorit arianism and Corporatism in Latin America , ed . James
M. Malloy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
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O'Donnell states that "our topic is 'Latin America' only in the trivial
sense; the pertinent historical context is provided by the political-
economy of nations that were originally exporters of primary materials
and were industrialized late, but extensively in a position of depen-
dency upon the great centers of world capitalism. O'Donnell goes on
to restrict himself to discussing corporatism in Latin America. He pro-
ceeds to restrict himself geographically. He then says that his hypo-
thesis does not really apply to Meso-Amer ica
. O'Donnell notes that
special situations (such as large exports of oil) change his formula.
Although he does not say anything further I read his work as a discus-
sion predominantly concerned with Argentina. It is in this tier of
states tliat the bureaucratic-authoritarian state looks representative.
2. Corporatism must be further differentiated into the in-
clusionary corporatism of the populist state and the ex-
clusionary corporatism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian
state
.
Inclusionary corporatism was a policy of the populist state.
Under the stimulus of the collapse of the Republican regimes in the
great depression, the state expanded itself with a new coalition.
The middle sectors and the military abandoned the commodity export
oligarchy, their liberalism and their laissez-faire. Instead they felt
compelled to establish a new coalition that would protect the national
economy and come to terms with the emerging and disgruntled urban
working class. If the established sectors were to avoid the choice
42
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between repressive stagnation or economic leveling, they were going to
have to generate meaningful growth. It is at this point that the state
is expanded to meet the inadequacies of the national bourgeoisie, and
avoid the total control by foreign capital. Under these regimes the
national government sponsored the creation of labor unions and interest
associations, created extensive public welfare programs (at least for
the politically recognized), and established state enterprises.
Within this inclusionary corporatism tvjo unexpected relation-
ships developed. One was the escalating demand for more economic bene-
fits and political control by the urban working class. The other was
the quick exhaustion of the import-substitution opportunities by the
newly protected private firms and the newly created national enter-
prises. Under the dual pressure of escalating and seemingly uncon-
trollable labor demands and exhaustion of the benefits of a program
of import substitution, those countries that had embarked on a program
of populist corporatism were forced to reconsider their commitments.
It is under these conditions that bureaucrat ic—authoritarian states
were established to implement an exclusionary corporatism.
Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are portrayed as established
on two principles. One principle is that a prominent place for dynamic
international capital must be established to invigorate the national
economy. The other principle is that the strident and dangerous demands
of the popular sector will have to be deactivated in order to bring
foreign capital in.'^^ A policy that corporatizes political
relation-
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 68
.
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ships can be constructed to do this. This progression of affairs is,
I see, an attempt to explain events in Argentiiia, Brazil, Chile, and
Uruguay
.
3. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state contains two com-
ponents, these are statizing corporatism and privatist
corporat ism.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is the main interest for
O'Donnell. This is seen as the ultimate product of capitalist devel-
opment in Latin America. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state engenders
a bi-frontal corporatism.^^ The first element of bi-frontal corporatism
is statizing corporatism. Here a process of conquering and subordinat-
ing the private organizations of the society is created. After that
there is privatist corporatism. Privatist corporatism is the process
of opening the organs of the state to colonization by private inter-
ests. It is O'Donnell's opinion that statizing corporatism is practiced
on the popular sector while privatist corporatism is open to the dominant
classes
.
In the previous pages of this chapter, I have described and
summarized the association of corporatism with the analysis of politics
in Latin America. As my discussion of corporatism has been descriptive
so far I would like to offer some interpretation to flesh out the
pos-
sible significance of a corporatist analytic approach. The
emergence
and expansion of a corporatist school of analysis for Latin
American
politics has been an abrupt phenomenon. Douglas A. Chalmers
acknowl-
edges that Latin American authoritarian regimes seem
to fit logically
47
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into this perspective. However, he cautions that "it is sobering to
remember, however, that each wave of regimes since World War II (at
least) has brought analyses which seemed to show that the most recent
type of regime was likely to endure because of its fit with underlying
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conditions." It is with this forewarning that the proposed models of
corporatist politics must be examined.
As the speculation about the possible nature of corporatist
politics has preceded over time, hypotheses have grown and elaborated
in reaction to prior speculations. Although much of what the cited
authors have written may appear to be in conflict with one another,
much of tlieir analytic efforts are compatible. The general proposi-
tions put forward by the three authors contribute to each other, and
some of the elements are already combined. O'Donnell acknowledges
that there is an ideological continuity with the past (from Wiarda)
,
although he is uncomfortable with the idea that there is a persistent
cultural tradition. Wiarda, in the Pike and Stritch book, sees the
societal corporatism and state corporatism typology (from Schmitter)
as a relevant expansion.
It is in the cultural versus economic realm that the differ-
ence crops up. The perception of value systems and the relative degree
of autonomy that sucli systems possess seems to be where the dispute
lies. Both Sclimitter and O'Donnell seem to feel that corporatism is
an ideology, a rationalization of relationships produced by the rule
of economic interest. Corporatism is a tail wagged by the economic
^^Douglas A. Cl aimers, "The Politicized State in Latin America,"
in AniJ^rj_t^rjjniism and Corporatism in Latin America , ed . James M.
MalToy^Pittsburgh, P. . : University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 36.
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^*^8' Wiarda s fomiulat ion, vnlue sysionis are ceded enough autonomy
to motivate political actors by themselves. It is noted that an eco-
nomic crisis is a strong reinforcement. It is also noted that an eco-
nomic crisis may act as a trigger mechanism, but there is a conscious
attempt to avoid a drift toward economic determinism.
The question of motivation behind the creation of corporatist
structures is the hazy area. All of the countries of Latin America
liave seen a profound change in the nature of their economies within
the last fifty years. They have also witnessed a profound change in
the constitution of their social order. Keeping this in mind there are
two general foci that the competing theories must deal with. One of
these foci is the lack of a tight socioeconomic interchangeability
among the Latin American countries. The other focus is the persist-
ing but variable influence of some non-economlc interest groups in the
different societies. Functional groups such as the Church, students,
military, or the state tecnicos can exert a critical influence in
domestic politics.
Once you move beyond the question of the source of corporatist
structures and face the question of the impact of corporatist move-
ments or corporat ist-based policies, there is a higher order of com-
patibility. As a base it can be asserted that there is a real cor-
poratist tradition present in most Latin American societies. Its in-
fluence and autonomy is debated. In addition, a succession of Latin
/\merican military juntas have displayed a strong interest in estab-
lishing formal corporatist structures.
The newly proliferated governments can be classified by a com-
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pound Lypology extrapolaLod from Lhe original three authors. In order
to classify a government in Latin America you should first ask oneself
a series of questions.
Corporat ism. Does the government reserve the right to struc-
ture, subsudize and control all political activity? As a further quali-
fication you would liave to ask whether the government is predisposed
to structure |)olitical activity along the lines of functional representa-
tion. A government that tries to structure, subsidize, and control
political activity cilong the lines of functional representation may
generally be rel erred to as corporatist.
Societ a l corporatism
. In order to further classify corporatist
governments, your next question would be whether the government you are
observing is conunitted to a program of societal corporatism or state
corporatism. If the legitimacy and functioning of the state depend
upon the activities of the functional interests, then you could classify
your government as an example of societal corporatism.
S tate corporatism . If, however, the government can be observed
to draw its legitimacy from other sources (such as the army or a politi-
cal party) and it becomes conunitted to keeping its functional interest
groups as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state, then you are
observing state corporatism.
1 nclusionary corporatism . A state committed to a policy of
inclusionary cor[)oriiL ism is interested in using its corporatist struc-
ture to activate social groups for its support.
B i -f ro n tal cawporat ism. A state committed to the structure
of state corporatism and follovjing an exclusionary corporatist program
40
is further marked by a bi-frontai corporatism in which a privatist
corporatism and a statizing corporatism are operating.
Privatist corporatism
. Here in privatist corporatism, the
corporatizing policies are used to open the offices of the state to
select groups, as a means of controlling those groups.
Statizing corporatism . In the statizing corporatism the cor-
poratizing structure is used to infiltrate and subvert independent
social groupings to exercise control over them.
This compound typology is a range of activity that a govern-
ment committed to a d e i u r
e
corporatizing of society may engage in.
It is helpful as the people who wish to investigate the motivation
behind a corporatizing government have some kind of model to derive
intent from. An active interest in ethos maintenance is the intent I
am investigating. 1 am asserting that this is propelled or activated
by a keen awareness of the current, dominant, political forces. That
is, the lack of national integration.
The previously mentioned process of change has repeatedly
raised crises of national integration. It is the crisis of national
integration that produces an interest in erecting corporatist struc-
tures in the twentieth century. 1 would like to propose that attempts
to attribute the reemergence of corporatism to any one single cause are
going to j:)rove fruitless. Although there is a general historical tradi-
tion common to all of the countries, and although there are some general
economic relationships common to all, all Latin American societies do
not operate in an interchangeable environment. A wide range of Latin
American governments throughout tlie twentieth century have repeatedly
4L
stated that they want to find an authentically national solution. This
ubiquitous desire is a realistic reflection of the critical differences
that 1 have mentioned. It is my feeling that these traits should be
accounted for whenever an understanding of Latin American politics is
attempted
.
The crises of national integration have a potential for crystal-
lizing along class lines, ethnicity lines, regional lines, or any com-
bination of tlie three. The different potentials for conflict are repre-
sented in the statistics about these societies. Tables 1 and 2 will be
used to point out tlie differences.
Countries like Argentina, with a population that is 82% urban
and an economy that is strongly oriented towards manufacturing, com-
merce and services, lias a much greater potential for classical class
conflict tlian a country like Paraguay. Paraguay is predominantly rural
(60%) and possesses an extremely simplified economy with the bulk of
the population engaged in hunting, fishing, agriculture and forestry.
That is 55% of the economically active population.
Countries like Peru, with an Indian population of 47%, or
Bolivia, with an Indian population of 63%, have a high potential for
ethnic polarization. Columbia with an Indian population of 1.6% or
Uruguay, with no listed Indian population, will never have to face
the stresses of a society stratified on ethnic lines. The net effect
of the observable statistical differences is that the type of crisis
of national integration varies from society to society. As the type
of crisis of national integration varies so the variety of corporatist
response will differ.
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
BY INDUSTRY
COUNTRY INDUSTRY*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Argentina
.14 .05 .19 .09 .15 .07 .26 .09
Bolivia
.63 .04 .10 .06 .06 .02 .07 .02
Brazil
.44 .06 .11 .06 .08 .04 .24 .02
Chile
.21 .03 .16 .07 .12 .06 .28 .09
Colombia
.39 .01 .16 .05 .14 .04 .23
Costa Rica
.37 .01 .12 .07 .11 .04 .24 .05
Cuba
.30 .20 .06 .12 .06 .25 .02
Dominican Republic .44 .08 .02 .06 .04 .14 .21
Ecuador .56 .01 .15 .03 .07 .03 .13 .03
El Salvador .47 .00 .08 .02 .07 .03 .14 .19
Guatemala .57 .14 .04 .07 .03 .13 .03
Haiti .83 .05 .01 .04 .01 .05 .03
Honduras .67 .08 .02 .05 .01 .12 .05
Mexico .40 .01 .17 .05 .10 .03 .20 .05
Nicaragua .46 .01 .12 .04 .10 .03 .23 .01
Panama .38 .08 .06 .12 .04 .23 .08
Paraguay .55 .15 .04 .07 .03 .15 .03
Peru .45 .02 .15 .04 .11 .04 .17 .03
Uruguay .17 .21 .05 .02 .13 .06 .27 .08
Venezuela .20 .02 .18 .08 .19 .07 .25 .01
*KEY : 1 = Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing;
2 = Mining and Quarrying;
3 = Manufacturing Industries;
4 == Construction, Utilities, Sanitation;
5 = Commerce;
6 = Transport, Storage and Conmiunica t ion
:
7 = Services;
8 = Other.
Taken from James W. Wilkie, ed . , Tlie Statistical Abstract of Latin
/\merica, 1977
,
published by the UCLA Latin American Center, Vol. 18,
(1978)
,
p. 46.
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TABLE 2
IU1}L\L AND URBAN POPULATION (197 5) AND
ESTHIATED AMERIND POPULATION
COUNTRY
POPULATION POPULATION
URBAN RURAL
I LAK
AMERIND %
Argentina
.81 .19 I960 .6
Bolivia
.39 .61 1960 63.0
Brazil
.51 .49 1960 1.5
Chile
.73 .27 1960 3.2
Colombia .63 .37 1961 1.6
Costa Rica .35 .65 1962 .6
Cuba .54 .46
Dominican Republic .41 .59
Ecuador .50 .50 1961 30.4
El Salvador .42 .58 1961 .4
Guatemala .32 .68 1959 53.6
Ha i t i .20 .80
Honduras .31 .69 1960 5.5
Mexico . 66 .34 1960 8.8
Nicaragua .44 .56 1960 2.9
Panama .54 .46 1960 5.8
Pa raguay .40 .60 1960 3.8
Peru .54 .46 1960 46.7
Uruguay .82 .18
Venezuela .76 .24 1960 1.5
Taken from James W. VJilkie, ed., The Statistical Abstract of Latin
America, 1977, published by the UCLA Latin American Center, Vol. 18,
(1978), pp. 81, 83.
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The related concerns in this paper are national integration,
ethos maintenance and corporatist politics. It is these three subjects
that 1 will establish an interrelationship betvjeen.
The concern with the crisis of national integration sets the
other two concerns into perspective. The crisis of national integra-
tion in Peru has been steadily evolving for almost fifty years. The
dimensions of the crisis have reached a point where the very nature of
the future Peruvian society is in doubt to large numbers of the cur-
rent power holders. This anxiety over the imminent overturning of the
social order has liad a two-fold effect. The first effect is to gener-
ate a strong consciousness about just what exactly is the nature of
Peruvian society. The second effect is to stimulate a great deal of
thought in examining exactly what will serve as the previously estab-
lished "common structure capable of relating the different units."
The evolution of this crisis and the development of a political
response will be the focus of the arguments in the following chapters.
CHAPTER V
CRISIS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PERU: FROM THE
OF LEGUIA TO THE REVOLUTIONARY
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
iolltics in Peru in the middle third of this century have cen-
tered on the very fundamental questions concerning the nature of
society. The topics of contention have been issues such as which
populations should be included in the national society. The question
of how power and wealth will be distributed has been prevasive also.
But the paramount issue is tlie diienuna on how to handle national inte-
gration. During most of this period there has been a lack of a com-
prehensive political consensus. Given this lack of a guiding value
system, many of the efforts of Peru's political actors are concerned
with establisliing a legitimacy for their goals.
1 would like to argue that one of the products of the political
conflict in this period is the development of a consensus on what the
"rules of the game" are for tlie political actors. This consensus has
been contributed to by noted Peruvian intellectuals, and Peruvian
political activists. It has spread amongst the contending political
parties and even reached what is called the paramount interest group,
the military.
The Revolutionary Military Government, inaugurated by General
Velasco and his associates, is the culmination of a process of diffu-
45
46
sioa of values. it is also an assertive act of ethos maintenance. It
is a realization that the pressures for a radical disruption of society
had to be dealt with in a comprehensive fashion. This is why the mili-
tary feels compelled to affirm the nature of Peruvian society and
search for a compatible structure for national integration.
ihe society that the military springs from and that society's
attendant problems can best be established by examining the work of
three authors. Francois Bourricaud, Julio Cotier and Carlos Astiz have
done the best job of describing the nature of pre-coup Peru. I will
sketch this society to suggest its dynamics and identify the context
that the political conflicts operate in. With the nature of pre-coup
Peru established, my next step in this chapter is to cover the opera-
tional guidelines for Peruvian politics. That is the ethos that the
military has striven mightily to maintain. Having established the na-
ture of the society and the value system in question I can finish my
chapter and go on to explaining how this has stimulated the corporatist
experiments of the military.
When studying modern-day Peru, one soon finds out that there
is no one good book on Peru. Sociologists, historians and political
scientists have all written extensively, and these individual authors
have emphasized different subjects. One of the better analysts of
power and society is Franqois Bourricaud. Her book. Power and Society
in Contemporary Peru
,
is cited by a wide range of authors to substan-
49
tiate their description of pre-coup Peru. Indeed, must of what is
^^Some of these works include: Carlos Astiz, Pressure Groups
and Power Elites in Peruvian Pol i t i cs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
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written by other autliors is an expansion or fleshing out of Bourricaud's
original, insightful analysis.
Bourricaud emphasizes the salient points of Peruvian society.
The characteristics of her contemporary Peru are a society that is
dualistic. It is a society that operates on the exclusion of a large
segment of the population. It is a society split along the lines of
Indian and non-Indian. It is a society marked by the presence of an
oligarchy, a society slowly and reluctantly being dragged into the
process of the democratization of that society.
Peru prior to the 1968 coup was a society dominated by its
oligarchy. This oligarchy was essentially white, hispanic, urban, and
centered in the city of Lima. Living in physical and cultural isola-
tion is a large "undigested" rural Indian mass. This non-acculturated
,
rural, Indian peasantry is the largest single segment of society. They
are closely complemented by a group of Indians who have acquired some
degree of acculturation. These are the Cholo's. There is also a
small but expanding middle sector. The people of the middle sector
are v^;llite, mestizo, professionals, government employees, shopkeepers,
and small entrepreneurs. A significant degree of education, and the
absence of an involvement in manual labor, are Important in defining
their status.
Press, 1969); Jane Jacquet te , "The Politics of Development in Peru"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, June 1971); and David Scott
Palmer, "Revolution from Above: Military Government and Popular Par-
ticipation in Peru" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, January
1973). In Abraham F. Lowenthal , ed.. The Peruvian Experiment: Con
-
tinuity and Change under Military Rule (Princeton, NJ : Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1975), there is Julio Cotier, Peter T. Knight and Jane
JacqueLLe. The anthology by David Chaplin, Peruvian Nationalism ^ _a
Corpora t ist Revolu tion (Nev^/ Brunsv>/ick, NJ : Transaction Books, 1976),
there is David Chaplin and Shane Hunt.
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Bourricaud emphasizes exclusion in the culturally stratified
Peru slie describes. The important middle sectors are defined by what
they are not. That is,
• . . in a country where the oligarchy is so sharply distin-
guished as in Peru, the middle class may be expected to de-
fine itself by its exclusion, whether forced or voluntary
from the elite. And as the country also comprises a large
percentage of illiterate Indians, the middle class is bound
to be conscious of all that distinguishes it from them: the
more so as the hierarchical scale is symbolically reinforced
by the racial and cultural distinction.^^
Into tiiis negatively defined middle class the skilled laborers
and unionized plantation workers may sometimes be cast. The working
class in the urban industrial sense is statistically small and not
particularly effective in politics prior to the 1968 coup.
Politics in this society have been centered around the attempt
at one end of the traditional elite to maintain its privileged position
wherever possible, and to minimize the erosion of power and wealth over
time. At the other end one find the forgotten ones, los olvidados
,
whose legal or extralegal focus has been on improving their precarious
existence. The politics conducted by the established actors have been
described as a very elaborate process of accommodation, sometimes re-
ferred to as "superaccommodation. '' Political change has been limited
as
,
Actually the old order, based on the cold-shouldering
of the illiterate masses, is being replaced, not by genuine
integration but by the partial acceptance of more and more
differentiated categories of persons who may succeed in
^^’’ran^ois Bourricaud, Povv/er and Society in Contemporary Peru
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 58.
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organizing
knowledged
in defense
factors in
of
the
their interests or
political game. 51
becoming ac-
Peru is described as the explosion that does not have to
place, the cataciysui that never arrives. The basic power issues
the contending forces in Peruvian politics, are then succinctly
take
,
and
sum-
marized as.
An oligarchy controlling at a distance a society with
which it does not feel a sense of identity; a rebellious
but prudent middle class; and a mass of under-privileged
citizens who find an outlet by organizing in defense of
specific and narrow interests or by committing brief acts
of violence whose political consequences have so far been
abortive—such is the picture of Peruvian society.
This sketch tliat Bourricaud has produced is one of a society
defined in terms of its cultural groupings of oligarch, mestizo and
the liidian underclasses. In the Mechanics of Internal Domination
,
Julio Cotier goes one step furtlier and describes the power of these
oligarchs and mestizos as the product of a system of internal domina-
tion of the Indian.
Cotier describes power relations in Peru as the product of a
linked system of international domination and internal domination.
Both by accident and by design the dynamics of power in Peru may be
described as a functioning system of domination. Within the country
there is a linked system of domination between the modern costa and
the traditional ^l_erj-a. Within the regions there is a linked system
of domination between the hispanic mestizos and the Indian underclass.
This distribution of power in Peruvian society is defined on a cultural
Ibid
. ,
p . 123.
^^Ibid., p. 137.
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basis. To the degree that power has been held and exercised by cul-
turally delineated groups, this establishes politics as a matter of
ethos maintenance.
The structural dualism of this society is a dualism of unequal
power. There is an unequal relationship between the larger interna-
tional economy and the Peruvian economy. In Peru the modern, urban,
mechanized, industrialized and politically potent costa receives the
bulk of the domestic capitalization. The yet traditional, rural,
primitive, agricultural and politically lame sierra transfers most of
its wealth to the coast. It is saddled with an under-capitalized
economy. Within the regions the mestizo segments own the land, the
stores and whatever investment resources there are. The mestizo popu-
lation of the c osta and the sierra
,
and in particular the mestizos of
the high puno
,
is located in a strategic position that makes this
group the lynchpin of the existing political, economic and social re-
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lations
.
The mechanics of mestizo domination that Cotier argues for are
described as.
The necessary and sufficient requirements of the system
of domination described are a function of the mestizo's ac-
cess to the system of authority through his knowledge of
Spanish and through literacy which allows him to elect or be
elected and to designate or be designated to fill positions
within the system of "national authority or within the pub-
lic administration" thus securing state resources to legiti-
mize his lineage and his domination of the Indian masses.
^^Cotler, "Mechanics of Internal Domination in Peru," in
Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution , ed . David Chaplin
(New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Books, 1976), p. 39.
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This access to the system of authority, that the mestizo ele-
ments monopolize, gives them the opportunity to maintain themselves
in a system of domination. The strategy for maintaining power centers
around tlie privatization of the state and segmentary incorporation.
The privatization of the state put the mestixo element in power
and it is aimed at keeping them in power. Suffrage has been carefully
restricted. A potential voter must be literate, and literate in
Q • , 55 ,,Spanish. ilie huge Indian segments of society have never voted in
any of Peru's elections. Although Indians may not vote, they are
counted for the purposes of representation.^^ This gives the rural
mestizo population a disproportionate representation in the congress.
in some districts rural representatives only needed a fifth the vote
,
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tliat a representative in Lima needed to achieve office. This privi-
leged position has given the mestizo access to the power resources on
a regional and a national basis without having to give more than
scant consideration to the Indian masses.
The discriminatory election laws have given the mestizo ele-
ments an invaluable power resource. That in turn has led to privatiza-
tion of more of the state resources for limited group benefits. One
of those benefits was the use of state lands. Prior to the establish-
ment of agrarian reform, the government of Peru had been endowed with
some agricultural lands over the years. The state rented these lands
^^Ibid.
,
p. 49.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 5.1 .
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ouL ill allegedly public auctions. In order for a citizen to bid he
liad to prove that he v^/as literate, held a voting card, and could get
a coimiiercial guarantee. This was something beyond all but the most
exceptional Indian. Other privatizing measures have cropped up over
the years. Parliamentarian initiatives were established. The initia-
tive gives individual representatives the power to personally direct
59a specific budget outlay to any purpose he chose. Surname laws were
established. Surname laws are any piece of legislation directed to one
particular individual or group of individuals.^^
Accompanying this privatization of the state was a pursuit
of a comprehensive policy of segmentary incorporation. Confronted
with a changing society and with a progressively mobilized popula-
tion, the established pov^er holders had to deal with demands from the
larger population. These were demands for wealth and power. In a sys-
tem of segmentary incorporation the benefits of society are awarded
61
only to select groups or parts of select groups. The different
social groups are incorporated into the national society in a partial
or incomplete manner. For example, some labor unions but not all labor
unions receive the cooperation of the government. A union that peti-
tions the government for recognition, insists upon government arbitra-
tion for a conflict, and supports a "reasonable” settlement from the
58
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labor ministry may find itself favored with a pay raise or a good con-
tract settlement. Other kindred unions that do not seek to cooperate
may risk being given nothing.
Ihis picture of pre-coup Peru that is emerging is a picture of
a society defined on rigid socio-cultural grounds, a society marked by
struggles over the control of basic power resources, and a society
where politics operate in a very v^/ell-def ined structure. The third
author that rounds out tlie description of Peru's political context is
Carlos Astiz. One of the hallmarks of Astiz's book is his detailed
description of how the extant parties fit into the larger Peruvian
social setting. Astiz's description of Peruvian parties offers in-
sights into how they fit into the process of ethos maintenance.
Like many Latin American countries, Peru after independence
was headed by military caudillos or by civilians installed by military
caudiilos . As Peru progressed further into the twentieth century,
tlie military found that it had to deal with a larger and more diverse
society. Simple force offered a smaller and smaller chance for
political control. Political parties became more and more indispen-
sable to the process. So-called "modern," effective, and successful
political movements arose and absorbed most of the political activity.
To describe the poJltical process, Astiz uses the dichotomy
of electoral machine and ideological party. Political movements in
Latin America are seen as producing one of these two types of organ-
izations. It is often hard to differentiate between local examples.
It is the degree of tliese qualities that provides the basis for defini
tion. The ideological party can be identified by its commitment to a
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set of principles, its strong concern with nationalist issues and its
ability to maintain its following in the periods it is out of office
and out of power. The electoral machine is created to meet the
immediate election needs of an individual or of a very specific group.
Nationalist concern is more likely to lose out to the special interests
of the group. Losing office or being pushed out of power can be fatal
to sucli organizations, as patronage is necessary to maintain much of
its following.
in the Peru that the Revolutionary Military Government took
over there were three established ideological parties. These are the
ALianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)
,
Accion Popular (AP)
,
and the Christian Democrats (DC). In addition, small but significant
Communist and Socialist parties have kept themselves on the scene over
the years. All of these organizations periodically produce splinter
groups. These organizations all operate as members of the Peruvian
power establishment.
Both the ideological party and the electoral machine have
operated in agreement in the political arena. The extant political
parties have operated in a culturally and economically stratified
society, a society marked by the lack of national integration and a
lack of a unifying political consensus. The ideological parties and
the electoral machines have agreed and cooperated in ethos maintenance.
They have accepted the "rules of the game" that the military and some
^^Ibid.
,
p. 89.
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elements of the oligarchy had insisted upon. All of the political par-
ties that I have mentioned are committed to a significant change in
Peruvian society, but all of them have accepted a very well-defined
operating code. Tliis agreement, 1 will reemphasize, is a commitment
to ethos maintenance.
Tlie insistence, that ethos maintenance is the guiding principle
in Peruvian politics, is a recognition that there are very concrete
codes that regulate the conduct of politics. These are canons that
derive from the impetus of the larger Latin American ethos. These
principles are a product of the Peruvian historical experience. They
are an adaptation and hence a very specific articulation that may not
be evident in other countries. Elements of this guiding ethos may be
seen in five concrete principles. These issues have been accepted
either in whole or in greater part by "those organized in defense of
their interests," as it is phrased by Bourricaud. The only signifi-
cant rebel had been the Ap ristas . However, after a 30-year running
battle with the Peruvian establishment, APRA bought into the larger
.... 64guidelines
.
I am asserting that the Peruvian military has been trying
to preserve the following very specific tenets. These are:
1. Elite Politics;
2. Segmentary Incorporation;
3. Catholic Christian Ideals;
4. Authentically National Solutions; and
5. The Middle Sectors Are Vital.
64,
. ,,,,As 1 1 z
,
p . 101.
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These principles can be expanded upon. I will try to show how they
are reflected in the commitments of the major political parties of pre-
coup Peru.
Elite Politics
A curious characteristic of Peru's political system is its
insistence that politics is best conducted by elites. Direct popular
control of society is considered to be dangerous or irrelevant. No
significant actor in pre-coup Peru advocated universal suffrage. The
Peruvian constitution had insisted that voters be literate, and liter-
ate in Spanish. it seems plausible that tlie oligarchy would be hos-
tile to letting the impoverished and illiterate masses vote their im-
mediate desires. It is less plausible that the reform-oriented par-
ties or the revolutionary socialists should be indifferent or hostile
to the idea of popular control of political office. But this is the
case and the political parties reflect this.
This is true of APRA. In May of 1924, Victor Raul Haya de la
Torre founded the APRA party. Ever since, APRA has been a signifi-
cant part of the Peruvian political spectrum. The Apristas have been
portrayed as the more successful of Peru's political parties. They
have been a well-organized, popular party, and they have received the
support of large numbers of Peruvians (literate voting Peruvians) over
many years. One of APRA's characteristics has been a commitment to
working through a political elite. The party has long held that
^^Frederick Pike, Tlic Modern History of Peru (New York.
Frederick A. Praeger, Publlsliers, 1967), p. 238.
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society has to be changed before universal suffrage becomes meaning-
tul. ihey have maintained that a small, restricted, specially edu-
cated, elite drawn from tlie vital middle sectors would transform Peru.
A similar disaffection with mass politics may be found in the
writings of Jose Carlos Mariategui. A contemporary of Haya de la
lorre, and founder of both the Communist and Socialist parties of
Peru, Mariategui mixed orthodox Marxist analyses of society witli a
strong Indigenis ta sympathy. As a committed Marxist, Mariategui be-
lieved in the necessity of forming a revolutionary vanguard. In ad-
dition he was greatly Influenced by the ideal of the Andean civiliza-
tions. "Natural" Indian communism as evidenced in the Inca society
was held up as a goal to be pursued. Mariategui strongly discouraged
looking for solutions in European models and that included liberal
6 8democracy. Mariategui set the direction for the communist and
socialist parties in Peru and has been a strong influence in later
revolutionary groups.
The newer political parties were not significantly different
from the older parties on this item. Accion Popular and the Christian
Democrats evolved out of the political ferment of the 1940s and 1950s.
Accion Popular was founded by Fernando Belaunde Terry, nephew
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of the noted Catholic Intellectual Victor Andres Belaunde. AP ar-
rived on the political scene with the advantage of having witnessed
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the travails of the Apristas. Accion Popular deemed it wise to avoid
making threats to the basic nature of tiie society. The question of
pressing for popular control of political office has been put to the
party in the past. A typical response has been quoted as,
• . . there is very little interest in tliis matter as it
would arouse too mucli opposition.
. . . Internally many in
the party would oppose such a matter.
. . . The vindica-
tion of such a measure would be unpopular, we would be very
much criticized and moreover we would have major opposition
from the Army.'^
The Christian Democrats were organized in this same period by
a group of Catholic laymen. Inspired by the Christian Democrats of
Europe, the Democr istianos have pushed for major structural changes in
Peru. One of the characteristics of the party is a rejection of vio-
lence as an acceptable path for change, and an insistence that reform
be pursued through the appropriate constitutional channels. Given
the literacy requirements of the Peruvian constitution this becomes
a coiimritment to elite politics.
This skirting of controversy, this aversion to empowering
the people, is symptomatic of the widespread belief that the people
can't manage their affairs unaided. The idea that some people are
better qualified to decide government policy, i.e., politics within an
elite, is a principle that the Revolutionary Military Government is
committed to defending.
^^^Cotler, "Mechanics of Internal Domination in Peru," p. 57.
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Segmentary Incorporation
Another aspect of Peruvian politics has been the development
of the practice of segmentary incorporation. Bourricaud made the
point that the old order based on the exclusion of the popular sec-
tors tiad been replaced. It had been replaced by a system centered on
the conditional acceptance of some sectors of society. This is called
segmentary incorporation. The practice of segmentary incorporation
has been accepted by the established political actors. One study in
particular does a good job of highlighting how that is established.
David Collier lias done a case study of squatter settlements and govern-
ment policy. One of the points he establishes is the use of land in-
vasion for instituting segmentary incorporation.
Collier focuses his study of squatter policy on the metropoli-
tan Lima area. The city of Lima witnessed spectacular growth, soar-
ing from havixig 6.2% of the national population in 1931 to having 24.2%
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of the national population in 1972. As the population of Lima grew
the large number of poorly housed urban inhabitants began to look to
the seizure of vacant lands abutting the city. As these seizures
occurred, different political actors recognized the potential for
political control in these legally vulnerable and politically dependent
group actions.
The advent of power brokering with land invasion incidents
is traced to the dictatorship of General Manual Odria. General Odria
^^David Collier, "Squatter Settlements and Policy Innovation in
Peru," in The Peruvian Exper iment , ed . Abraham Lowenthal, p. 132.
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took power in an anti-APRA coup that followed the abortive APRA coup
of 1948. General Odria and his supporters were not merely concerned
with repressing the APRA party. They were actively engaged in an at-
tempt to build a popular movement that was independent of the Apristas .
Odria establislied a common format for squatter invasions.
This became the norm for this type of political brokerage. He estab-
lished a pattern of seeking out prospective land invaders and suggest-
ing covertly or announcing publicly that the government would not evict
squat ters
. The seizure would be organized, and carried off en masse.
After the territory was seized a community association would be organ-
ized. To move into the settlemtn or to be given legal title to a lot,
one had to work through the organization. It was expected that the
residents would be appropriately appreciative and turn out for desig-
nated government rallies. Towards the end of his term, when the dic-
tator was considering running for the office of president, squatters
75
,
moving into the settlements were expected to join his party. An-
other part of the pattern of power brokering was the illegality of
the land seizure. Although land seizure was encouraged and facili-
tated by the government, the government rarely granted title. The
resultant illegality of the occupation was an overt government policy.
This was calculated to keep the residents obligated to the government
and to make them dependent on staying on good terms with the officials.
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With Che end of the Odria government, the following APRA sup-
ported Prado government tried to change the dependent relations of
squatter and government. Law 13517 of 1961 set up a procedure for
legalizing the existing settlements and for granting land titles.
Unfortunately the law included many stringent provisions that made it
hard for the designated government agency to grant land titles. This
had the effect of subverting the law. Government authorities soon
reverted to ignoring die law and dealing with the settlements on a
case by case paternalistic fashion. Accession of a new government
produced little change. After Accion Popular achieved power, land
seizures were not encouraged, but the status of squatters was not al-
7 8tered. This state of affairs continued up to the last few months
of the Belaunde administration. As a result, the inhabitants of the
squatter zones of Lima were held in a state of legal limbo up until
the initiation of the Revolutionary Military Government.
The opportunity for political incorporation on a segmentary
fashion was not limited just to those who control the government.
Squatter invasions could also be organized by political parties that
didn't control the resources of the national government. Towards the
end of Odria' s term, conservative backers of Pedro Beltran began to
organize a land seizure of their own. Although they did not have
access to the authority of the government, they did have money to back
^
^Ibid
. ,
p
.
1A2.
^^Ibid
. ,
p 143.
^^Ibid
. ,
p 136.
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their efforts. iliey also had access to public opinion and political
influence through Senor Beltran's newspaper. On the local level, land
seizures could be organized to embarrass the national government and
aid municipal governments controlled by opposition parties. After
the Belaunde government came into office in 1963, several municipal
governments used their resources to organize land seizures. This in-
cluded several local governments controlled by the Apristas.
Collier's case study offers a pertinent example of the accep-
tance of segmentary incorporation by the political establishment.
Needless to say, squatter settlements are not the only sphere open to
policies of segmentary incorporation. Dependent, paternalistic rela-
tions between the government and the different social groupings have
persisted and may be found in the policies of the Revolutionary Mili-
tary Government. Although initially chary of such an activity, the
necessity or desirability of segmentary incorporation has been recog-
nized by the present junta. They have continued this practice and made
it part of the ethos they want to preserve.
Catholic Christian Ideals
Like the rest of the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in
the new world, Peru is a Catholic society. The depth of the church's
penetration of some Indian regions may be open to question, but there
is no denying that the church has held a near monopoly position on
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religious activities. The church has been present since the conquest
and has made a concerted effort to tend to the spiritual, ethical and
educational needs of the host society. The days when the church could
operate without hindrance passed with the wars of independence and the
resultant growth of secularism. In spite of this the teachings of
the Catholic church have had a strong influence ever since.
The terms of political discourse in this Catholic society
reflect Catholic Christian ideals. This is done both explicitly and
implicitly. An organization such as the Christian Democrats is rather
obviously motivated by the spiritual and ethical pronouncements of the
church. Other political movements such as the Apristas have been for-
mally anti-clerical. Disenchantment, however, or hostility towards
the church as an institution has not interfered with political move-
ments accei)ting the larger values.
The political significance of the church has long been appre-
ciated by Peruvian politicians, and has figured in several major con-
flicts. Political conflicts involving the church have been central to
the political development of Peru. In this century the Dictator Leguia
initiated his Oncenio (1919-1930) with an attempt to dedicate the coun-
try to the Order of the Sacred Heart. This controversial ploy by
Leguia, himself a high order Mason, sparked a massive political out-
cry tliat started the political careers of such student activists as
.
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^
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and Jose Carlos Mariategui. As the
twentietli century progressed and more of the citizenry became disen-
^^Astiz, p. 163.
®"Pike, The Modern Hist ory of Pe,^, P- 235.
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chanted with Criollo liberalism. The position of the Church on social
issues became a base for castigating the semi-democratic and semi-
capitalist Peruvian establishment.
The importance of championing Christian ideals has been given
different priorities. The short-lived fascist movement in Peru was
the most fanatical in the advocacy of Catholic Christian ideals. Popu-
lar with the clergy, the fascits did not hesitate to attribute all the
problems of the country to the abandoning of Catholic moral and ethical
norms. Frederick Pike succinctly describes their concerns as: "Fascism
in Peru was characterized by a disillusionment with liberal capitalism,
which was pictured as a selfish. Godless, materialistic system con-
cocted mainly by Protestants, Masons and Jews and in total opposition
83
to the Christian spirit of the middle ages."
Moving along the political spectrum one can find much more
sophisticated advocates of Catholic Christian ideals in post-World War
II Peru. Prominent Catholic layment began to search for an answer
to the foundering Catholic institutions of Peru. General Jose Luis
Bustamante y Rivero, president from 1946 to 1949, was one of the first
to voice such concern. Bustamante y Rivero articulated the concerns
3. S •
There is more and more the impression that too much
emphasis on the doctrinaire aspects is often placed from
the pulpit, without insisting enough on the usual Christian
norms of living. . . . There is sometimes a lack of human
emotion and of Christian indignation to harass social in-
justices and merchants' greed. There is fear of injuring
the powerful, and respectful euphemisms are employed to
condemn authoritarian abuses. From it grows the widespread
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belief that the church goes along with the interest groups
and maintains an implicit alliance with the temporal
powers.
. . .
ihis concern with the erosion of Catholic norms spawned a
commitment to political activism among Catholic laymen. This activism
was channelled primarily to two political movements. These movements
are the Christian Democrats and Accion Popular.
Chronologically AP evolved first. Fernando Belaunde Terry was
the moving spirit behind this movement. Astiz imputes that Belaunde
modeled much of his program around the programs of the Christian
85Socialists of Europe and the Christian Democrats of Chile. Belaunde
had tlie good fortune to have one of Latin America's noted Catholic
intellectuals, Victor Andres Belaunde as his uncle. Accion Popular
fashioned a program in tune with the concerns of the Catholic estab-
lishment and successfully won the approval of Church over the
86
Christian Democrats in the 1963 elections. Although Accion Popular
was not set up as a vehicle to advocate Catholic Christian ideals, it
was more electorally successful than the Christian Democrats and was
able to successfully preempt it.
The Christian Democrats evolved in the same period as AP . They
may be accredited with giving the advocacy of Catholic Christian ideals
a liigh priority. The Christian Democrats made an effort to offer a
comprehensive analysis of Peru's problems. The Democr ist ianos
84
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rejected both Marxism and Capitiilism as valid ways of organizing human
87
society. The excessive egoism of Capitalism and the excessive
materialism of Marxism had to be combatted, and the norms of Catholic
humanism had to be championed. The party sought to define a "third
88position." The Christian Democrats have described themselves as the
first Peruvian political movement to base itself on Christian thought.
Moving down the scale of priority, for Catholic Christian
ideals, one comes to the Apristas and sundry revolutionary socialists.
APRA was formally anti-clerical and hostile to the Church, as an in-
stitution of the Peruvian establishment. That, however, did not pre-
vent them from seeing man and state in terms that the church had de-
fined. Society is defined as an organic entity and the state is
charged with a paternal role. The ends of the state are defined as
"guaranteeing the life, health, moral and material well-being, educa-
tion, liberty, and economic emancipation of the working classes. . . ."
90
Political crises are seen as being moral crises. Apristas see the
political solution for Peruvian society in a functional democracy
that will meet society's needs because it is a "political system in
v^7hich the citizen has rights and duties as a citizen and also has
rights and duties flowing from his participation in the economic life
^^Ibid.
,
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^^Peter T. Knight, "New Forms of Economic Organization," in
The Peruvian Experiment , ed . Abraham Lowenthal, p. 357.
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of the country." The theme of the spiritual renovation of Peru is
emphasized by the Apristas. Aprismo is described as more than a politi-
cal party. It is described as a pliilosophical and moral movemeiit.^^
The use of religious metaphor may not be anything more than a recog-
nition of the powerful symbolism of Christianity in Peruvian societ-.
Whether it is or is not valid, APRA has not hesitated to assert that
'As surely as Christ suffered upon the cross, to the Apristas must
93suffer to win the redemption of Peru."
Moving to the bottom of the scale of priority, one examines
the Marxist organizations in Peru. One of the unique aspects of
Marxist movements in pre-coup Peru is the pervasive influence of Jose
Carlos Mariategui. Mariategui established himself as one of the out-
standing Marxist writers of Latin America. Within Peru his influence
has marked revolutionary groups ever since. One of the paradoxes of
his writings is his insistence that communism was primarily a spiri-
94
tual movement, not a materialist movement. Part of the validation
of the communist revolution in Peru was to be the spiritual renovation
of a Peru corrupted and debased by the capitalist penetration of
society. Elements of Christian mysticism were not seen as incompatible
with a Marxist society. Mariategui argued that "There is a mysticism
in Marxism and those who adhere to it come very close to the spirit of
91tk- ^Ibid
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the Christianity of tlie catacombs
.
In my preceding paragraphs I think that I have established a
concern for Catholic Cliristian ideals in the Peruvian political es-
tablishment. Throughout the twentieth century there has been a persis
tent concern that the ideals of a Catholic society were not being
adequately safeguarded. There has been an ongoing concern that this
must be championed in the political arena. That concern has carried
over to the military and they have made it a part of their program of
ethos maintenance.
Authentically National Solutions
Another one of the guiding principles for Peruvian politics
has been the insistence that political programs reflect a truly
Peruvian response to the problems facing society. One of the persis-
tent debates that ran through Peru in the early twentieth century was
the argument between the proponents of Indigenismo and the proponents
96
of Hispanlsmo
. These two parties argued over the true nature of
Peruvian society. This conflict affected the political actors. The
Indigenistas succeeded in casting doubts on how useful non-Peruvian
practices or ideals would be in ordering a society that contained a
large Indian population.
By the 1920s, significant elements of Peru's political estab-
lishment had begun to incorporate a rejection of European models of
^^Ibid.
,
p. 238.
96
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political programs. The issue appears to have become a popular theme
of Peruvian intellectuals in the 1920s. The ever-wily dictator Leguia
seized upon this and warned that his dictatorship was necessary to pre-
vent the advance of communism in Peru. The communists in turn were
quick to assert that it was the Indian communism of the Inca society
. no
that would provide the model for their society. The Apristas re-
flected this trend when they argued, "Since Peruvian economic reality
is completely different from that of Europe, Peru cannot take European
99socialism and introduce it into the country."
That period of ferment successfully established the principle.
By the time the Cliristian Democrats and AP had arrived on the scene
it was a central part of their programs. Accion Popular claimed that
the significance of their program was due to their having searched
for truly national solut ions . The Christian Democrats put less of
an emphasis on the truly national solution. What they did emphasize
was that their party offered a third way, a way that was neither
capitalist nor communist. This was an implicit appeal to nationalist
sent iment
.
This insistence on truly national solutions and the hostility
to "foreign" ideologies was picked up and is one of the tenets the
military has chosen to champion.
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The Middle Sectors Are Vital
Peruvian politics has also contained a call to look after the
interests of the middle sectors. This appeal for the protection of the
middle sectors has had many different justifications. Victor Andres
Belaunde is credited with describing how the fragility and impoverish-
ment of the middle sectors was responsible for many of the country's
difficulties. He began to circulate this idea in 1914, and by the
1920s it had gained wide currency.
This theme was seized by several opposing groups. Leguia and
his backers felt it was important for the country to look after the
interests of the middle classes. This was seen as a necessary part
102
ot building a strong, modern nation and a healthy capitalist system.
Haya de la Torre argued that the country had to advance the welfare
of the middle classes for different reasons. Haya, philosophically
at least, argued that a large and vital middle class was necessary to
usher in the socialist revolution. It was his argument that the middle
class was the revolutionary class in the underdeveloped countries of
the world. Specifically,
. . . the imperialism to which underdeveloped countries
are subjected is the first stage of their capitalism.
Hence the weak nations must encourage the imperialist
process, for it will create the capitalism which will
generate a powerful proletariat together with the middle
sectors necessary to lead the dov^rntrodden in a socialist
revolut ion.
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From this point on the middle sectors were courted by almost all of tiie
mainstream political actors. The only notable exceptions were the
communists, who stuck to the working classes as the vehicle of the
revolution.
Accion Popular and the Christian Democrats evolved in a politi-
cal environment in which the importance of the middle classes was a
given. Accion Popular offered a program to meet the needs of the mid-
dle sectors. AP emphasized the expansion of bank credit, industrial-
104ization and the importance of domestic entrepreneurs. The Christian
Democrats appealed to tlie desire of the middle sectors to prevent a
, .
. r:
^
. c • 105radical transformation of society.
This concern with the welfare of the middle sectors has been
a pervasive part of Peruvian politics. It has been an Important
principle, and it is an issue that the military has decided to work
f or
.
These principles have been givens and a prioris . They have
formed a code of conduct for political actors in pre-coup Peru. They
had been part of a common structure capable of integrating the differ-
ent units. This system of elite politics, segmentary incorporation.
Catholic Christian ideals, authentically national solutions, and an
advocacy of the middle sectors was part and parcel of the dominant
value system. These practices were part of a value system that has
defined Peruvian society. It is a value system that defines the pos-
Astiz, p. 114.
^^^Lowentlial, T he Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change
under Military Rule , p. 357.
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session of wealth, power and status in Peru. These practices include
people and exclude people. They designate who is eligible to partici-
pate in the allocation of power, and they are the mechanisms for per-
petuating many of the features of Peruvian society.
In the 1960s the basic nature of Peruvian society was chal-
lenged. Revolutionary groups tried to set up a successful destruction
of the extant order. Society in Peru had become sufficiently differen-
tiated for significant groups in the population to be alienated from
the larger system. They were sufficiently alienated to organize for
the purpose of destroying the existing political and economic rela-
tions in Peru. That well-defined structure had been shaken. The
larger society was not incorporating the more widely differentiated
sectors of society. The political system was not preventing the emer-
gence of attempted cataclysmic change, neither was it defusing that
revolutionary thrust.
The complaint that "criollo liberalism” had failed Peru has
circulated since the 1920s. By 1968 a large percentage of the officer
corps of the Peruvian military had come to accept this. The military
had also become convinced that there was a real chance that Marxist
guerrillas could incite a successful revolution. Faced with what they
considered to be a serious breakdown in the political system, combined
with a violent ai>peal for revolution, the military saw little else to
do but intervene. The purpose of the resultant intervention was the
establisliment of an alternative political economy. This alternative
political economy was supposed to preserve the larger political ethos
of the Peruvian status quo. It would, hopefully, leave the established
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social groups reasonably intact.
The description of events that I have related in this chapter
suggests that the political actors in Peru believed that they had
three ideals of political economy that one could choose to organize
society around. This would be a system of liberal democratic
capitalism, a system of revol ut ionary socialism, and a system of cor-
poratism. The alternative political economy that might provide the
conmion structure for integrating the differentiated units was seen as
a corporatist systeii).
Peru had an established counter-tradition that promised to pro-
vide a working social system. Throughout the twentieth century a size-
able chunk of the Peruvian electorate had insisted that "criollo liberal-
ism" had to be replaced. They had also insisted that revolutionary
socialism had to be avoided. The fascits had advocated a corporate
society. The Apristas had called for functional democracy, and the
Christian Democrats had decided to press for a third way that would
replace capitalism. This counter-tradition was invoked by the military.
It was Invoked because it was seen as the most plausible avenue for the
preservation of significant elements of the existing social order.
The principles I have enumerated are believed to be necessary to the
continued operation of society. To this end the Peruvian military has
embarked on a program of corporatist experimentation.
In my following chapters I will describe how the policies of
the military have worked to preserve that specific political ethos. I
will describe how the system of corporatism is designed to maintain
designated parts of Peru's society.
i' C n A P T E R V I
I
THE VELASCO REGIME
I
On October 3, 1968, the armed forces of Peru staged a coup and
I
overthrew the civilian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry.
;
Cliarging the existing political order with corruption, incompetence
i and abusive self-interest, the Revolutionary Military Government is-
I
sued the First Statute of the Revolutionary Government. This called
for the dissolution of the legislature and the assumption of legisla-
tive power by the president and the cabinet. The military, in turn,
filled these positions.
' Relying upon a Peruvian counter-tradition of political organ-
I
;
Izatiou, the military formally committed itself to instituting a new
corporatist government. This was deemed necessary because the mili-
tary felt that the Peruvian political system was incapable of realiz-
i
j
iiig the interests of the country. In the evaluation of the military,
I
tliey were going to have to supplant the immoral extant system of
(
I
I politics.
’ Once instituted, this singular government became the object
I of close scrutiny. One subject that has engendered heated debate
I
j
and much questioning is the motivation for the policies of the Revo-
^
*^^Palmer
, p . 1 .
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lutlonary Military Government. By examining the choice of policies and
other actions of this junta I would like to offer a description of the
type of corporatism produced in Peru. Utilizing the compound typology
of corporatist systems 1 abstracted in Chapter IV, I will try to place
the military government in a specific niche of corporatism. I will also
describe how that choice of corporatist organization works to preserve
the ethos I allude to.
The first pliase of military rule in Peru covers the period
1968 to 1975. It is in this period that the military sets up the cor-
poratist structure. Interpreting the actions of the government has to
be done by hindsight. In and of itself the original proclamations
and initiatives of the government did not make it easy to divine the
intent of the government. Much of what the government proclaimed was
vague enough to have several possible implicit meanings.
This is evident from the start. Leader of the coup and later
[^resident. General Juan Velasco Alvarada, gave as a rationale for the
military government the following famous declamation. The central
figure of the junta stated that:
. . .
formal democracy . . . represented nothing more than
the interplay of political interests, for which the people
and its great problems were always secondary matters.
The legitimacy of this Revolutionary Government cannot
rest on the respect for the rules of a politically decadent
game which only benefitted the privileged groups of the
country. Our objectives have nothing to do with the tradi-
tional forms of cr iollo politics. . . • Our legitimacy does
not come from the votes ... of a political system which is
rotten to the core because it has never served to defend the
authentic interests of the Peruvian people.
1
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Such a rationale does not help place the military government
in a scale of corporatism. It speaks of what must be avoided. Please
note the forms of crioHo politics are labeled as reprehensible, not the
cr^oU^ social order. Also note that it is the interplay of political
interests that causes problems, and not the value orientation of
cr iollo society.
The commitment of the military was made much more concrete when
they explained that the revolution would offer a system of revolution-
ary humanism. Politics as such would be replaced by a system of
participatory social democracy. Revolutionary humanism would be
achieved by establishing social justice. Social justice was somewhat
circumspectly defined as "The provision of each citizen with the eco-
nomic means to move from subsistence, to pursue in harmony with society
109full social and cultural development."
Palmer deduces four facets of participatory social democracy.
These four factors are the moral order of solidarity, worker manage-
ment, social property, and self-government within the individual's
day-to-day assoc iations
. As defined by the government these charac-
teristics place their political experiment squarely in the corporatist
cont inuum
.
The moral order of solidarity is to be fostered by the crea-
tion of a corporate system of participation. The people will be formed
into local units of participation to manage their workplaces and resi-
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dences. The people will be instructed in government; they will then
acquire experience and a change in their economic status. As the citi-
zens are judged to have acquired the ability to rule themselves, their
role in government will be expanded to include local government.
After this, governance of the nation will be achieved. Labor and
capital will be given equal input into economic enterprises
.
Now with this type of commitment it is possible to start moving
down the scale of corporatist systems. The functional interests have
a very clear relation to the state in these pronouncements. Society
is defined as groupings of functional interests. And in this cor-
porate system of participation the government has decided it will or-
ganize these interests and instruct them. To this end the government
set up an agency. By proclamation, on June 24, 1971, SINAMOS was set
up and charged with:
1. Training, orienting, and organizing the national popula-
t ion;
2. The development of corporate organizations for society;
3. Handling communication between the government and the
national population.
113
This is a clear conmiitment to State Corporatism. The functional in-
terest groups are set up as dependent organs of the state, and the
government drav^;s its legitimacy from another source. In this case,
it is the armed forces.
^^^Ibid., p. 54.
^^^Ibid., p. 91.
'^^See page 39 of this thesis for this typology.
78
With that point established one next has to look at the commit-
ments the government has made in the period 1968 to 1975. This will
allow you to further classify events and determine if this has been an
Inclusionary Corporatism or an Exclusionary Corporatism.
The government in Peru has written its policies here, in
clear and unmistakable terms. It has both initiated positive programs
and reacted in a repressive manner. The government’s initiatives
turned to the formation of new national communities. With the Agrarian
Reform Law of June 24, 1969, the government nationalized the large
agricultural holdings of the native elite and foreign companies
.
Agrarian cooperatives were established. The accompanying political
units were organized into Agrarian Social Interest Societies (S.A.I.S.).
This was followed by the establishment of an Industrial Community on
July 27, 1970.^^^ The Fishing Community was organized on March 26,
1971, and the Mining Community was organized June 9, 1971.^^^
This concern with establishing state-sanctioned functional in-
terests continued in an unblushing carrot-and-stick fashion. Not only
were groups encouraged to seek out the government's path, many were
punished for failing to stick to the straight and narrow. In 1969,
the older National Agrarian Society tried to contest the Agrarian
Reform Law. In retaliation the government declared it illegal and cre-
ated the National Peasant Association to replace it.^^^ The government
^^"^Palmer, p. 131.
^
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also moved to secure a monopoly on public access to information. On
November 10, 1971, the government passed a law giving the government
tlie right to reorganize the radio and television stations of the coun-
.
118
try.
As the government was presented with resistance it continued
to react. In November 1973, the national teachers' union, SUTEP, was
captured by Marxists in internal elections. That elicited a swift with-
119drawal of recognition by the government. Political parties also
drew more than scorn from the government. In May 1974, the govern-
120
ment outlawed APRA once more. And finally, after a long running
confrontation, the government nationalized the country's newspapers on
July 27, 1974.^^^
In differentiating between Inclusionary Corporatism or Exclu-
sionary Corporatism, you must decide if the government has pursued a
policy of activating or deactivating social groups. As the government
has acted in a two-steps-forward-and-one-step-back fashion, this be-
comes a subjective judgment. My reading of its activities is a read-
ing that sees the government as concerned with control. The government
insists on structuring participation, and is very concerned that things
do not get out of control. That strikes me as a decision to engage
in Exclusionary Corporatism.
118
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This commitment to State Corporatism and a program of Exclu-
sionary Corporatism is also marked by a policy of Bi-Frontal Corpora-
tism. In this system of Bi-Frontal Corporatism that the military
operated, one can see both Privatist Corporatism and Statizing Cor-
poratism. The Privatizing Corporatism can be seen in the commitment
of the military to setting up economic communities and allowing them
to receive benefits from the government. Here the offices of the
state have been opened to select groups to give the government a
greater degree of control.
Statizing Corporatism is evident in the policies of the govern-
ment. There is no question that the government has been interested
in penetrating and subverting independent social groupings. The ex-
tant political parties have been the object of a policy of repression
and co-optation. Witness their being cold-shouldered by the creation
of SINAMOS to do many of the functions they once did. The labor unions
have not faired well either. The creation of communities to manage
sectors of the economy eliminates the management-labor split and works
to subvert that existing independent social grouping.
This system of State Corporatism with its program of Exclu-
sionary Corporatism, its Bi-Frontal Corporatism, and its dual policy
of Privatizing Corporatism and Statizing Corporatism; this political
program also conserves elements of the older value system. The cor-
poratizing program of the military has effectively worked to maintain
the specific ethos that I outlined in the last chapter. The clearest
example of this is the linkage between Catholic Christian ideals and
government policy. The Revolutionary Military Government has never
81
lieslLaLed to portray its concerns as one with the Church. The "moral
message of Christianity" was affirmed in the "affinity of the thought
of the Cliurch of the poor and the exploited and that of the Armed
Forces and the revolutionary population in the common cause of build-
122ing a new society in Peru." The military has also felt it advan-
tageous to explain its temporal concerns as consistent with the
Church's teachings. The hostility of the military to class struggle
is officially related to the concern with a moral order of solidarity
as "workers and management should be a family, the class struggle has
123
no place here, in a society of solidarity."
On a less obvious level the military's commitment to Catholic
Christian ideals is reflected in its choice of advisors and consultants.
Substantially prior to the coup, the military had displayed an inter-
est in contemporary Catholic through!. At the much-touted Center for
Higher Military Studies (CAEM)
,
the military began inviting prominent
124
clerical figures such as Msgr. Lebret
,
to lecture. After the mili-
tary seized power, their commitment to Catholic Christian ideals may
be seen in their acceptance of sizeable segments of the Christian
Democratic program. Social property was given political credence by
the Fifth International Christian Democratic Congress in October
1959.^^^ In the 1960s, the Christian Democrats of Peru committed
themselves to establishing empresa communitar la . In the fall of 1968,
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the concept was proposed in legislation. Once the military came in
they turned to this ideal and the people who championed it.
The commitment to elite politics also stands out in a clear
manner. It is the military as a qualified and self-prepared elite v/ho
has set themselves up to save the country. Policy, initiatives, and
decisions flow from the top to the bottom. This is recognized and
referred to by many analysts. It does not appear to be seriously
disputed by anyone.
The issue of segmentary incorporation is more complex. The
miJitary lias advocated a strong, revolutionary ideology and it has been
rather strongly committed to democratizing society. The junta has,
however, been ambivalent about dismantling segmentary relations. It
was also not unduly concerned with avoiding programs that produce
de facto segmentary incorporation. De facto segmentary incorporation
may be observed on a wide spectrum. The government talked of creating
social property to create a new relationship between workers and
property. The government offered this as evidence of its good revo-
lutionary credentials. Studies carried out at a later date suggested
that no more than 10% of the industrial work force would benefit from
127
the enabling legislation. That left the greater part of the work
force unincorporated into the new order.
The economic communities offer an example of the junta's un-
easiness over discontinuing policies of partial or incomplete incor-
poration. Economic communities were set up to reorder the relationship
1 '?6
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of workers, management, and capital. They were also intended to es-
tablish a direct relationship with the government. This establishing
of economic communities did not confer equal economic benefits for all
parties. The well-to-do Fishing and Mining Communities were allowed
share in the rather good-sized profits they generated. The less-well-
off Industrial Communities and the impoverished Agricultural Communi-
ties only had access to the revenue they generated. Within communi-
was little transfer of funds. Well-to-do sugar coops
did not have to make significant transfers to subsistence highland
dairy operations. This overt program of conferring unequal economic
benefits to different sectors of the economy was coupled with a refusal
129to reorganize tlie tax structure to transfer wealth. This is an
example of a decision to continue the segmentary incorporation of
society.
The acceptance, more than the advocacy, of segmentary incor-
poration is also reflected in the Revolutionary Military Government's
policy on urban land seizure. Initially, the government was hostile
to using land invasions for political brokerage. Allegedly this was
due to a concern of the armed forces that the government should func-
i;
tion through the military as an institution, not through personalismo .
Land seizures did not stop with the promise of a better life under the
1
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Revolutionary Military Government. There were repeated attempts to
establish squatter settlements. Faced with the reality of a housing
shortage that was not disappearing any time soon and a population versed
in the potential for successful land seizure, the military chose to
give SINAMOS the responsibility for new settlements. SINAMOS was
charged with settling people on suitable lands. The flagrant
brokerage that characterized pre-coup Peru was avoided. The military,
however, maintained a control mechanism to channel incorporation.
The emphasis on authentically national solutions may also be
readily established. Taking up the old cry for solutions that reflect
the special problems of Peru, President Velasco stressed the importance
of creating new forms of economic organization. The creatioii of social
property was offered as proof of the government's commitment to seek-
132ing out that which is neither capitalist nor communist. This em-
phasis is a direct continuation of programs the civilian political
parties have advocated. The experience of professionalization in the
military has been a force for seeking Peruvian solutions. The previous-
ly-mentioned Center for Higher Military Studies is cited as a force for
133
raising a strong nationalist consciousness amongst the officer corps.
An insistence on national solutions is attributed to the learning en-
vironment of the CAEM. The insistence on national solutions that is
cited in government programs is an honest appeal to a long-standing
131
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intellectual and political tradition.
The concern with tlie middle sectors is also part of a long-
standing tradition. Jane Jacquette has produced an argument for this
in her essay, "Belaunde and Velasco: On the Limits of Ideological
Politics." Jacquette discusses the discernable continuity between
the policies of APRA, AP and the Revolutionary Military Government.
She very concretely argues that:
The purpose of comparing ideology and practice under
Belaunde and Velasco is to discuss parallels . . . through
the identification of key similarities between Belaunde's
ideology and that of the Velasco regime. These similari-
ties rest on shared middle class and technocratic values,
including a deep fear of violent revolution,
Beyond a sharing of larger middle-class values, there are very specific
policy issues tl)at display this. This is evident in the economic
policy of the Velasco regime. Consonant with their civilian precur-
sors, such as APRA or AP
,
the economic policy of the junta shares the
belief that the motor force of economic development lies outside the
state bureaucracy . The labor communities received much publicity,
however the national bourgeoisie was seen as a vital force for na-
tional development. As a result the government has channelled credit,
created incentives and tried to exhort the middle sectors to join the
136
programs and support the Revolutionary Military Government.
Tliis affirmation of ethos that I argue for is an important
goal . The corporatist structure and the corporatizing programs have
Jacquette, p. A02.
^
1 b id
. ,
p . 406
.
^^^Ibid
. ,
p . 422
86
been set up to make structural changes. It has been hoped that these
programs would successfully maintain a very important value system; an
operating code thought vital if not indispensable for the continuation
of civil society. This situation, alas, did not work out as desired.
The Revolutionary Military Government set up by Velasco and his circle
of backers fell upon dire circumstances. A series of conflicts in the
period between the Spring of 1974 and the Spring of 1975 resulted in the
replacement of Velasco by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. With the
advent of Morales Bermudez the revolution takes a substantially differ-
ent tack.
CHAPTER Vil
THE SHIFT IN NATIONAL POLICY
With the advent of the regime of General Frangisco Morales
Bermudez the "revolution" of tlie military took an abrupt turn. The
issue of ethos maintenaiice was handled in a radically different man-
ner by the two regimes. During the ascendancy of General Velasco and
his 'radicals" in the military, ethos maintenance was pursued by an
organized program of corporatist institution building. The regime of
Bermudez may be characterized by its emphasis on repression. With the
failure of many corporatizing programs and the active opposition of a
growing sector of the Peruvian establishment, the government abandoned
institution-building. The majority military opinion was that ethos
maintenance would have to be pursued by repressing disruptive ele-
ments.
The move to an emphasis on repressing disruptive elements
was precipitated by an expanding crisis. The organized and the estab-
lished elements of Peruvian society had not silently acquiesced to the
Revolutionary Military Government. Neither had they succumbed to their
Involuntary suspension. Instead the period from 1968 to 1975 was marked
by several general strikes, a series of bloody mine strikes, politi-
cally inspired riots and unregulated peasant invasions. At the same
time the government had taken control of the radio and TV stations,
banned tlie political parties, seized the newspapers and engaged in a
87
88
program of jai]fng and deporting political activists. In spite of
the government's display of force, a police rebellion was fomented in
1975. This persistent and spirited resistance resulted in a retrench-
ment and reevaluation by the military.
By 1975, serious internal and external problems beset the mili-
tary. The corporatizing programs were neither producing the support
desired nor eliminating as much of the resistance as was needed. The
i[iterna tional economy faltered and produced undesirable terms of trade
for Peruvian coimnodities
. The Humboldt current became sufficiently
erratic to disrupt the 1 ishing industry. The IMF began to pressure
tlie junta to make severe alterations in its budget. The pressures
on the military multiplied dramatically and the military's ability to
control the political arena began to deteriorate. Differences in-
creased within the military. This led to a progressive polarization
of the armed forces. The resultant institutional conflict produced
an interest in withdrawing from the risk-fraught process of governing.
The retreat into a program of repression was precipitated by
a convergence of crises. The crisis is a composite one. There is an
economic crisis, a political crisis and an institutional crisis.
Holding center stage is the economic crisis. The combination of
massive international borrowing and a distressed economy have kept
the Peruvian economy in jeopardy since 1976.
This economic crisis is both of the military's making and not
of the military's making. After seizing power the junta engaged in a
massive program of investment to build a strong national economy.
The major engine of development was the national government. The
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principle source of capital was foreign loans. Between 1965 and 1973,
the government's share of the economy rose from 16% to 55%.^^^ Be-
tween 1972 and 1977, the government quintupled its international debt
from one billion dollars to five billion dollars. This government
directed program of investment was predicated on several assumptions.
The government was committed to the export of commodities to support
the economic plans. After the discovery of oil in the Amazon basin,
the government began to look forward to the export of oil. The govern-
ment assumed that the number one foreign exchange earner, the fishmeal
industry, would be reliable. It also looked forward to significant
returns from the copper deposits it was opening.
Events, alas, worked against the Peruvians. The anchovies
1 39disappeared from Peruvian waters. This was damaging enough.
Worse luck yet, the Amazonian oil deposits failed to prove out. Mem-
bers of the international banking community had expected to see Peru
140
export a billion dollars of oil a year by 1980. On these grounds
the government had secured a 750 million dollar loan to build a ques-
141
tionable trans-Andean pipeline. The government had also invested
heavily in new copper mines. Unfortunately, the second half of the
142
1970s saw a depressed international market for copper. This corn-
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mitted the Peruvian government to large fixed loan payments. As the
strategic Peruvian industries failed to produce the needed foreign
earnings the government was forced to curtail the national budget.
Due to severe differences over how to alter the budget and a reluc-
tance to believe that the economy was imperiled, Peru wobbled close
to default on its international loans.
Tlie blame for this state of affairs is hard to place. Interna-
tional lenders had sought out Peru as a prudent investment. As late
as 1975, experts from the IMF, the World Bank, and major private lend-
ing institutions were agreed that Peru could comfortably handle $2.8
1 A 3billion in additional development loans. The military in turn
eagerly rose to the occasion and came up with 84 projects that could
144
absorb $6 billion in loans. They were able to secure some $3 bil-
145lion in loans before things began to collapse.
In an environment of shrinking earnings and growing debt
obligations the government found itself confronted with a no-win
situation. Continued investment in Peru and access to foreign capital
goods, energy and armaments were seen as an absolute necessity. Fail-
ure to meet loan obligations might deprive Peru from access to these
items. The only sure formula for meeting these debts were austerity
budgets. This had been insisted upon by both the IMF and private
lenders. Substantial cuts in the government's budget meant choosing
between restricting the large armaments purchases or severely cutting
143
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social expenditures. Stringent pursuit of either option would be an
explosive policy for the reigning administration. Needless to say,
Morales Bermudez waffled on this as long as possible. Events became
sufficiently dire to bring about action. A consortium of private banks
monitored the Peruvian economy for six months. Allegedly they ab-
stained from giving the Peruvian government any direct orders. After
the sol was devalued by 30%, the budget severely cut, imports cut,
price controls removed and wage controls set up, a $390 million loan
146
was extended. These austerity measures were bitterly unpopular.
They weakened the government and drove people into the waiting arms of
the political parties. As neither the Peruvian economy improved nor
the debt service disappeared this scene was repeated later. This time
around it was the IMF that was appealed to. The IMF pointedly in-
sisted that the huge budget deficits were the cause of the Peruvian
government's difficulties. In the 1977 budget, the Peruvian govern-
ment had allowed for a deficit of $625 million.^^^ The fact that arms
purchases were estimated at $300 million a year for the two years prior
148did not sit well with the IMF. A compromise was struck that gave
Peru $100 million in stand-by credits and improved their standing with
149
private lenders.
This extended down-spiral of the Peruvian economy coupled with
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the abrasive austerit/ measures has alienated some supporters of the
regime and driven many people from quiescence into active opposi-
tion. ibis has pushed the government into a repressive role.
the political crisis has centered on the resiliency and effec-
tiveness of the pre-coup political parties. The government had been
concerned with supplanting independent political groups with state-
created and state-regulated interest groups. The chosen vehicle had
been the government agency SINAMOS. The efforts to erect corporatist
interest groups never met the expectations of the military. SINAMOS
failed abjectly. Many interest groups and all the political parties
survived. The organizations created by SINAMOS either languished for
lack of participation or were captured by political activists of the
pre-coup political parties.
The labor organizations were an immediate object of the
government's corporatizing programs. APRA had long been established
in many unions. The communists controlled the largest labor organ-
ization, the Conf ederacion Generale de Trabajadores (CGT). SINAMOS
set up the rival Central de Trabajadores Revolucionario Peruana
(GTRP).^^^ The government-sponsored organization failed to make in-
roads into established labor constituencies and never became relevant
to the labor scene.
The efforts of SINAMOS to organize the agricultural sectors
was not much more successful. The Confederacion National Agraria (CNA)
was set up to organize the agricultural sector. Although the CNA
^^*^hatin Americ.i, January 10, 1975, p. 14.
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successfully Incur poriiLed many agrlcu]tural units, the APRA-controlled
sugar coops stayed out of And even more ominously, a communist-
backed CoTifederacion Campesinos del Peru (CCP) developed. The CCP
actively competed v^;ith the government for the sympathies of the dis-
^ , .
152tressed campesinos .
On another front SINAMOS had been set the task of organizing
a competitor to tlie leftist-controlled teacher's union, SUTEP. The
government set up the Sindicate de Educadores Revoluclonarios del
153Peru (SERP). Operating under the auspices of SINAMOS, SERP was
to wean the teachers from their independent ways. That never came to
pass. In the national elections for the state teacher's agency SUTEP-
15Abacked candidates absolutely trounced the SERP slates.
The original strategy behind setting up a national organiza-
tion to channel political participation had been an interest in con-
trolling political activities. SINAMOS had produced a dismal record.
Not only did the programs fail to undercut the established political
organizations, but SINAMOS prodded many groups into active opposition.
SINAMOS 's reputation as an agent of government control was negatively
received. It made it a liability to be associated with SINAMOS.
Another disturbing development was the Frankenstein evolution
of some or gani za t i ons . The CNA was set up to organize the agricultural
^^^
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sectors for the government. By late 1976 the CNA had displayed signs
of being both criticaJ and unresponsive to the government . The CNA
had evolved into an active opponent of the government.
The lackluster record of SINAMOS and its government-sponsored
organizations disappointed large numbers of the military. By 1976,
the government liad stopped looking for a solution in nationally-
sponsored institutions. This visible retreat by the government
spurred more resistance from the Peruvian political establishment.
The third crisis was the institutional crisis of the military.
From tlie beginning of the Revolutionary Military Government there has
been a demand tliat the institutional integrity of the military remain
intact. Personal ismo
,
alliances with the political parties or plotting
to overthrow the revolutionary junta of the three branches of the armed
forces was strictly off limits. General Velasco was removed by a
156
„
,
P ronunciamen to Institut ional of the revolutionary council. Bermudez
did not seize his office for his own ends.
Tlie mi Jitary was seriously rocked by bitter internal disputes
over tlie course of tlie revolution. This became evident in the period
between February 1975 and April 1976. Throughout tJie larger period
of tlie Revolutionary Military Government, there had been differences.
However, by 1975 tlie military had become seriously polarized. Sig-
nificant numbers of the officers could be placed in the category of
radical or conservative.
in_^erj_cji, October 8, 1976, p. 311.
’^^’batin America, September 5, 1975, p. 274.
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Under the leadership of General Velasco much of the policy of
the government could be described as "radical" or change-oriented.
The dissatisfaction with the results of these programs culminated in
the removal of Velasco. Domestic turmoil escalated and more and more
of the military began to advocate a comprehensive program of repres-
sion to keep events under control. The fragile majority opinion held
that the political turmoil would be worsened by abandoning the revolu-
tion and openly v,/arring against radical elements. The conservative
minority was large enough to plot and intrigue without serious hindrance
from the government.
The police rebellion of February 5, 1975, was taken as a sign
by many officers that the government had foolishly encouraged radical
elements with its policies. From then until Morales Bermudez declared
a second phase for the revolution, the institutional integrity of the
military was sadly neglected by many officers.
The pressures on Velasco resuited in his replacement by
Morales Bermudez. The departure of Velasco did not placate all of
the conservative elements in the military. These disgruntled offi-
cers \-jere sufficiently distressed to look for an occasion to stage a
successful coup.
On the niglit of February 13, 1976, General Gonzalo Briceno
issued an ultinuitum to the government to stop dealing with radical
elements and start a crackdown. Other military units failed to join
General Briceno and lie was successfully censured and dismissed from
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his comniaad
. Briceao's ill-timed gambit was not an isolated inci-
dent. Later that sunmier General Carlos Bobbio Centurion ordered the
troops out of the Lima barracks to take up defensive positions
around the city. Alleging that a compact mass of people were moving
on the city he ordered the troops out to their preplanned defensive posi-
158
tions. Bobbio neglected to contact his superior officer General
Jorge Fernandez Maldonado. The furious Prime Minister Fernandez
159Maldonado (a radical) demanded and received Bobbie's resignation.
These ill-concealed invitations to a coup clearly communicated that
conservative elements were insisting on comprehensive changes if the
Revolutionary Military Government were to remain in power.
These cracks in institutional integrity were slowly patched
up by Morales Bermudez. He recognized that the military would no long-
er support the unrestrained turmoil produced by the attempts at policy
innovation. He therefore accepted the message being communicated to
him. In April of 1976, Morales Bermudez propounded a theory of revolu-
, . u 160 _
tion that described all revolutions as having two phases. ihe
first phase of change and innovation had been adequately explored
by the Velasco regime. The second phase of the revolution was a phase
1^-1
of clarification and consolidation. In the future the government
157- _Latin America, February 27, 1976, P-
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would concentrate on meeting the demands of the original innovations.
The three converging crises that I have described have com-
bined to push the government into a reversal of policy. The program
of corporatist institut ion—building has given way to a program of
repression. The military is still very mucli concerned with ethos
maintenance. Tliey have, however, lost faith in the ability of corpora-
tist institutions to do the task by themselves. The military appears
to hold the attitude that elements of the old ethos can be kept func-
tioning by using the simple expedient of repression. This is some-
thing of a regression for the military and 1 do not see it holding
much promise.
CHAPTER V 1 1 I
CONCLUSION
The corporaList politics of the Revolutionary Military Govern-
ment have been a singular experiment. No other government in Latin
America, military or civilian, has made such a comprehensive attempt
to fall back upon the corporatist counter-tradition that has coexisted
with most of the formally liberal-capitalist systems of the region. The
decision to save the old value system while discarding the old power
structure is a remarkably sophisticated program that few militaries
in Latin America have thought of trying.
How events worked out for the military is another matter. The
seemingly well-intentioned military was greeted with resounding dis-
approval. Taking heed of the lack of support and determined resis-
tance, the military decided to opt for the traditional course for
military governments. The military abandoned its program of corpora—
tist institution-building and reverted to the familiar threat of grue-
some repression if events proved too outrageous. The head of the
Revolutionary Military Government, Morales Bermudez, announced the
withdrawal of the military and the scheduling of a constituent assem-
bly and elections. S LNAMOS was abolished along with one of its
163
mo re vital creations, the Confederacion National Agraria.
Rounding
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out the wiLlidrawal the government declared a general amnesty for all
political and social prisoners. ilris was followed by an announce-
ment that the newspa|)ers seized by the government would be resold to
tlieir former owners.
Faced with a completely unsatisfactory set of affairs, the mili-
tary gave politics back to the civilians. There are many lessons here.
Perhaps one of the most pertinent lessons illustrated here is the
limitation of enlightened self-interest as a vehicle for change. The
military had assumed it could successfully appeal to the Peruvian
political establ ishmi'nt . There was an assumption that "those organ-
ized in defense of their interests" could be made to see the wisdom of
the military's action. In return, the military could count on their
support while reorganizing society to coopt or suppress revolutionary
elements. The military, unfortunately, never got a very high degree of
support from the Peruvian political establishment. Neither the
unions nor the activists from the major political parties ever had a
very great degree of trust in the military. Although the Peruvian es-
tablishment will close ranks and back the military in the face of vio-
lent revolution, and possibly a foreign war, things break down for
less dramatic events. If the stakes do not appear to be as high, then
the different elements of society strike out to preserve their own in-
terests. A situation like this guarantees a vigorous and coherent
repression of revolutionary forces. It also means that it will be
164
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difficult to make structural reforms.
Another aspect of the limitations of enlightened self-interest
may be seen in the military. Wlien it became apparent that the initial
program of corporatist institution-building was inadequate, and the
population was turning against them, the military reverted to old-
fashioned repression. The military should have known from their own
experience that repression alone will not stop forces for change. Their
original decision to be, selectively, as revolutionary as the revolu-
tionaries was a much wiser course of action. As pressure mounted on
the military, rational self-interest failed to reassure many officers.
An anxious military chose to employ threats of violence, rather than
move into an unfamiliar environment.
The wliole issue of ethos maintenance remains in the political
arena in Peru. The need to establish a common structure capable of
relating the different units is still a major concern. Although the
military is handing power back to the civilians, it may not have aban-
doned its concern with ethos maintenance. What the unsuspecting
military put itself through may serve as a powerful enough object les-
son to keep tlie political parties sensitive to the need for ethos
maintenance
.
The military experimentation has had a conservatlzing effect.
The point has been made that the significant redistribution of wealth
and power means a transfer of wealth from productive sectors to less
productive sectors. It also means a transfer of power from the sec-
tors of society already well organized in defense of their
interests
to the numerous unorganized and impoverished people. Such
a course
action would produce a severe diminution of wealth and power among the
extant power holders. Attempts by the military to do this have been
bitterly unpopular. It would be expecting a lot to have the established
power holders redistribute themselves out of power and out of influence.
The popular pressures for change have not diminished. However, reform
will not be so blithely entered into. The military had attempted to
implement many of the traditional Aprista and Christian Democrat reforms.
Some of these programs were not particularly successful, and other pro-
grams were very controversial. The Apristas and others have had the
benefit of having the military stick its neck out and receive the onus
for a number of failures. The military's actions may have convinced
reform politicians tliat it is wiser to advocate less sweeping change.
For the time being, it appears that the politicians are not
about to leap into very many fundamental changes. The one exception is
the subject of universal suffrage.
One of the elements of the Peruvian political ethos that I
argued for in my paper was a commitment to elite politics. Universal
suffrage was the issue I suggested that reflected this. The Peruvian
political parties had displayed an extreme allergy to the idea of uni-
versal suffrage. No political party in the twentieth century has ad-
vocated universal suffrage. Not APRA, not Acclon Popular, not the
Deraocrlstianos
,
not the communists, not the left-splinter parties.
With the recent (1978) exception of Hugo Blanco s FOCEP (Frente de
Obreros, Campesinos, y Estudiantils Popular), no political party has
felt it could threaten the politically significant minority with such
a bald-faced commitment to a radical redistribution of power and
goods.
102
ihis has radically changed. Hugo Blanco, the former Trotsky-
ite guerrilla, has successfully pushed for universal suffrage. Al-
though the institution of a system of one man/one vote has a strong
potential for change, tliere is an irony here. The implacable demand
of the forces for radical change is now centered on voting rights.
This is a significant change from 1965. At that time, Hugo Blanco and
others established a peasant rebellion with the avowed goal of creating
167
a successful socialist revolution. The fact that Hugo Blanco was
permitted to be politically active, and the fact that Blanco seemed to
feel that the proper focus for the radical forces was the vote indicates
a change.
Although repression by itself is no solution, the military has
demonstrated tliat it can successfully destroy guerrilla operations.
Events have also displayed that the political establishment will back
the military in an environment of immediate threats to the system.
Given these demonstrated realities the radical establishment is now
pursuing the path of non-violence.
The question of the success or the failure of a program of
ethos maintenance can also be addressed. The military pursued its pro-
gram of institution-building out of the fear that "criollo liberalism
had failed and would fail to protect the true interests of the Peruvian
social order. Going by its own avowed goals, the Revolutionary Military
Government has failed, and it is withdrawing from politics. Pure cor
^^^^
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poratisni will not be instituted in Peru.
Wliat stands out is the durability of the Peruvian political
system. "Criollo liberalism" is every bit as much a part of the estab-
lished system as government-sponsored interest groups. The forces of
"criollo liberalism" successfully withstood twelve years of suspension,
and occasional repression. The military could not operate without the
support of the "system" and neither can the radicals. It is a tribute
to the political acumen of Blanco that he is choosing to push for
non-violent reform. It may be the only path open to him. The advent
of universal suffrage may also work for ethos maintenance. Voting
rights in and of tliemselves confer no inherent changes. Opponents
of this move have raised specters of tax leveling, the election of
large numbers of Indians, and immediate change. There is no guarantee
that this will come to pass. The political brokers have not disap-
peared from politics in Peru. There is a tremendous potential for
manipulation of a large mass of political ignorant people. Universal
suffrage can also he a force for conservatism, for ethos maintenance.
Given that the mi Jitary was not panicked into a coup by this, there
is a tacit acceptance of this. They may see the conservative poten-
tial here.
Tills durable Peruvian political order is not well appreciated
by other analysts of Peru. The theory of politics in Peru has yet to
be adequately explained. There are forces operating, and my analytic
approach does a good job of explaining them. I argue that an
analytic emphasis on the elements of the political ethos gives an
investigator information tliat has to be accounted for. I
believe that
104
Lhis is a productive path. Ethos maintenance is an ongoing process
and it has not stopped. The military has succeeded in having the terms
of political discourse defined to protect most of the value system. A1
though its formal experiment is over, it has guaranteed the avoidance
of violent and radical change.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Astiz, Carlos A. Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Poli tics.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Bidney
,
David. Ihc'oretical Anthropology
. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1953.
Bill, James A., and Hardgrave, Robert. Comparative Politics: The Quest
for Theory . Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Pub., 1973.
Bourricaud, Frani^'ois. Power and Society in Contemporary Peru . New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970.
Business Week . March 21, 1977.
Chaplin, David. P eruvian Nationalism, a Corporatist Revolution . New
Brunsv^/ick, NJ : Transaction Books, 1976.
Collier, David. "Squatter Settlements and Government Policy." In The
Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under Military Rule .
Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. Princeton, N J : Princeton
University Press, 1975.
Cotier, Julio. "Mechanics of Internal Domination." In Peruvian National-
ism, A Corporatist Revolution . Edited by David Chaplin. New
Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Books, 1976.
Cotier, Julio. "The New Mode of Internal Domination." In The Peruvian
Experimen t : Continuity and Change Under Military Rule . Edited
by Abraham F. Lowenthal. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Press, 1975.
Deadline File for Data. "Peru." Card 5, Card 20, Card 21. Greenwich,
CT; DMC Corp.
Foster, George M. Cul ture and Conquest . Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books,
1960.
Gar son, G. David. Handbook of Political Science Methods . Boston, MA:
Holbrook Press, 1976.
Gil Tin, John P. Human Nays, Selected Essays in Anthropology . Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969.
105
106
Heatli, Dwight U.
,
and Adams, Richard N., eds. Contemporary Cultures
and Soci eties of Latin America
. New York: Random House, 1965
Jacquette, Jane S. "The Politics of Development in Peru." Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Cornell University, June 1971.
Jacquette, Jane S. "Belaunde and Velasco: On the Limits of Ideological
Politics." In The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change
Under Military Rule . Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. Princeton,
NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975.
Kantor, Harry. The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Party.
Nev; York: Octagon Books, 1966.
Knight, Peter T. "New Forms of Economic Organization." In The Peruvian
Experiment: Continuity and Change Under Military Rule
. Edited
by Abraham F. Lowenthal. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Press, 1975.
Latin America . January 10, 1975.
January 24, 1975.
May 9, 1975.
September 5, 1975.
February 27, 1976.
April 9, 1976.
July 16, 1976.
October 8, 1976.
October 31, 1976.
Latin America Political Review . January 9, 1978.
June 9, 1978.
June 23, 1978.
July 28, 1978.
Lowenthal, Abraham F.
,
ed . The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and
Change Under Military Rule . Princeton, NJ : Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1975.
Maslow, Abraham. Motivation and Personality
,
second edition. New York:
Harper and Row, 1970.
Malloy, James M.
,
ed. Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America .
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1977.
Morse, Richard M. "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government."
Journal of the History of Ideas
,
xv (1954): 71-93.
New York Times . July 28, 1974.
November 6, 1974.
107
1 aimer, David ScotL. Revolution from Above: Military Government and
Popular Participation in Peru.” Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University, January 1973.
Pike, Frederick B. The Modern History of Peru . New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1967.
Pike, Frederick B.
,
and Stritch, Thomas, eds. The New Corporatism,
Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World . Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.
Wagley, Charles. The Latin American Tradition: Essays on the Unity
and the Diversity of Latin American Culture . New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968.
The Wall Street Journal . September 1, 1977, p. 17.
Wilkie, James, ed . S tatistical Abstract of Latin America 1977 . UCLA
Latin American Center, Vol. 18 (i973).
Willems, Emilio. Latin American Culture: An Anthropological Synthesis .
Nevv7 York: Harper and Row, 1975.
iL

